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Jennifer Daskal

The Un-Territoriality of Data
a b s t r a c t . Territoriality looms large in our jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to the
government’s authority to search and seize. Fourth Amendment rights turn on whether the
search or seizure takes place territorially or extraterritorially; the government’s surveillance
authorities depend on whether the target is located within the United States or without; and
courts’ warrant jurisdiction extends, with limited exceptions, only to the borders’ edge. Yet the
rise of electronic data challenges territoriality at its core. Territoriality, after all, depends on the
ability to define the relevant “here” and “there,” and it presumes that the “here” and “there” have
normative significance. The ease and speed with which data travels across borders, the seemingly
arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical disconnect between where data is stored and where it is
accessed critically test these foundational premises. Why should either privacy rights or
government access to sought-after evidence depend on where a document is stored at any given
moment? Conversely, why should State A be permitted to unilaterally access data located in State
B, simply because technology allows it to do so, without regard to State B’s rules governing law
enforcement access to data held within its borders?
This Article addresses these challenges. It explores the unique features of data and
highlights the ways in which data undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between
data location and the rights and obligations that should apply. Specifically, it argues that a
territorial-based Fourth Amendment fails to adequately protect “the people” it is intended to
cover. Conversely, the Article warns against the kind of unilateral, extraterritorial law
enforcement that electronic data encourages—in which nations compel the production of data
located anywhere around the globe, without regard to the sovereign interests of other nations.
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in t r o d u c t io n
In December 2013, United States federal law enforcement agents served a
seemingly innocuous search warrant on Microsoft, demanding information
associated with a Microsoft user’s web-based e-mail account. But there was a
problem—the e-mails sought by the government were located in a data-storage
center in Dublin, Ireland. Consequently, Microsoft refused to turn over the emails, claiming that the government’s warrant authority did not extend
extraterritorially; the warrant was therefore invalid. The government, along
with the magistrate judge and district court, disagreed—concluding that the
relevant reference point for purposes of warrant jurisdiction was the location of
the provider (in this case Microsoft), not the location of the data.1 Because the
Ireland-based data could be accessed and retrieved by Microsoft employees
within the United States, the warrant was territorial—not extraterritorial—and
therefore valid.2
The question of where the relevant state action takes place when the
government compels the production of e-mails from an Internet Service
Provider (ISP) is one of first impression and is now being litigated before the
Second Circuit. It has garnered the attention of communication companies
throughout the United States, the Irish government, the European Parliament,
media outlets, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a wide array of
commentators.3 In a strongly worded letter, the former European Union
1.

See In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), argued, No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Sept.
9, 2015) [hereinafter Microsoft]. The case is now pending before the Second Circuit. See
Transcript of Oral Argument, Microsoft [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript, Dist. Ct.,
Microsoft]; Brief for Appellee, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled
& Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2015) (construing a
Stored Communications Act warrant as a form of compelled disclosure, akin to a subpoena,
under which the location of the provider controls).

2.

See Microsoft, supra note 1, at 476 (concluding that a warrant “places obligations only on the
service provider to act within the United States”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, In re
Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.,
No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Oral Argument Transcript, 2d Cir.,
Microsoft]; Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 32-33 (rejecting the claim that there is anything
extraterritorial about Microsoft being compelled to disclose to U.S.-based law enforcement
officials records under its control).

3.

Amici on behalf of Microsoft in the Second Circuit include a list of the who’s who from the
telecommunications industry, including Apple, Amazon.com, Accenture, AT&T, Verizon,
Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, and eBay; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers; companies representing a range of media outlets, including
ABC, Fox News, Forbes, The Guardian, McClatchy, National Public Radio, and The
Washington Post; the Government of Ireland; the Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs; computer and data science experts
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Justice Commissioner warned that execution of the warrant may constitute a
breach of international law4—a sentiment echoed in the amicus briefs
supporting Microsoft.5 But this statement simply assumes the answer to the
key questions that the case poses: where does the key state action occur? At the
place where data is accessed or the place where it is stored?
The dispute lays bare the extent to which modern technology challenges
basic assumptions about what is “here” and “there.” It challenges the centrality
of territoriality within the relevant statutory and constitutional provisions
governing the search and seizure of digitized information. After all, territorialbased dividing lines are premised on two key assumptions: that objects have an
identifiable and stable location, either within the territory or without; and that
location matters—that it is, and should be, determinative of the statutory and
constitutional rules that apply. Data challenges both of these premises. First,
the ease, speed, and unpredictability with which data flows across borders
make its location an unstable and often arbitrary determinant of the rules that
apply. Second, the physical disconnect between the location of data and the
location of its user—with the user often having no idea where his or her data is
stored at any given moment—undercuts the normative significance of data’s
location.
This is not to say that tangible objects are immovable or that they are
always co-located with their owner. Both people and objects travel from place
to place. And people can be, and often are, separated from their tangible
writing to clarify how the cloud operates; and nonprofits. Links to the amicus briefs are
available at DIGITAL CONST., http://digitalconstitution.com/about-the-case [http://perma
.cc/D8FC-9Z4H]. See also Editorial, Adapting Old Laws to New Technologies: Must Microsoft
Turn Over Emails on Irish Servers?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/07/28/opinion/Must-Microsoft-Turn-Over-Emails-on-Irish-Servers.html
[http://
perma.cc/R8JD-V3WT]; Orin Kerr, What Legal Protections Apply to E-mail Stored Outside the
U.S.?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2014), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e
-mail-stored-outside-the-u-s [http://perma.cc/YUG5-DWKX]. Communication companies
warn of a devastating loss of business if the government prevails.
4.

Letter from Viviane Reding, Comm’r, Justice, Fundamental Rights & Citizenship, European
Comm’n, to Sophie in’t Veld, Member, European Parliament (June 24, 2014), http://www
.nu.nl/files/nutech/Scan-Ares-MEP-in%27t-Veld-.pdf [http://perma.cc/A4V5-NLXX].

5.

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Anthony J. Colangelo, International Law Scholar, in
Support of Appellant at 18-19, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled
& Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014) (warning that
execution of the warrant would violate Ireland’s sovereignty and therefore constitute a
breach of international law); Brief of Amici Curiae Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., Liberty & the
Open Rights Group in Support of Appellant at 24-25, In re Warrant, slip op. (arguing that a
decision to bypass the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in place between the United States
and Ireland violates the United States’ treaty obligations and is “contrary to law and
precedent”).
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property by an international boundary. But the movement of people and their
physical property is a physically observable event, subject to readily apparent
technological and physical limitations that affect how quickly bodies and
tangible things can travel through space. By contrast, the movement of data
from place to place often happens in a seemingly arbitrary way, generally
without the conscious choice—or even knowledge—of the data “user” (by
which I mean the person with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data,
such as the user associated with a particular e-mail account).6 An e-mail sent
from Germany, for example, may transit multiple nations, including the
United States, before appearing on the recipient’s device in neighboring
France. Contact books created and managed in New York may be stored in
data centers in the Netherlands. A document saved to the cloud and accessed
from Washington, D.C., may be temporarily stored in a data storage center in
Ireland, and possibly even copied and held in multiple places at once. These
unique features of data raise important questions about which “here” and
“there” matter; they call into question the normative significance of
longstanding distinctions between what is territorial and what is
extraterritorial. Put bluntly, data is destabilizing territoriality doctrine.
Data also challenges territoriality’s twentieth-century companion criteria—
citizenship and national ties—as determinative of the constitutional and
statutory rules that apply. It is now widely accepted that both citizens and
noncitizens with substantial voluntary connections to the United States enjoy
basic constitutional protections (including the protections of the Fourth
Amendment) even when they are located outside the United States’ borders.7
Conversely, the Fourth Amendment does not protect noncitizens outside the

6.

In making this claim, I assume that the author of a document or e-mail retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data, even if stored by a third-party provider. This is obviously
a contested claim. See, e.g., Sherry Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 126-30 (2002) (noting
and critiquing the doctrine that information exposed to third parties loses its reasonable
expectation of privacy); Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J.
1087, 1118 (2006) (warning that under current doctrine a “wide variety of ostensibly
confidential information shared with third parties . . . remain[s] outside the protection of
the Fourth Amendment” and that statutory protections are “piecemeal and inconsistent”).

7.

See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1957) (extending jury trial rights to civilian
dependents of the military located abroad); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Eric Holder, Att’y
Gen. 38 (July 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/pages/attachments
/2015/04/02/2010-07-16_-_olc_aaga_barron_-_al-aulaqi.pdf [http://perma.cc/T55C-CVS
W] (“Because al-Aulaqi is a U.S. citizen, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as
well as the Fourth Amendment, likely protects him in some respects even while he is
abroad.”).
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United States, absent sufficient voluntary connections to the nation.8 Thus,
territoriality doctrine, at least for constitutional purposes, involves a two-part
inquiry into territoriality and target identity—with target identity turning on
the depth of the target’s connections to the United States.
But just as data highlights the arbitrariness of making the location of
mobile zeroes and ones determinative of the rights and obligations that apply,
data also exposes the problems with making identity determinative of such
rights and obligations. Digital footprints are neither observable nor readily
identifiable as “belonging” to a particular person. While an Internet Protocol
(IP) address might reveal a user’s location, the use of anonymizing services and
other tools designed to protect the user’s privacy (or evade detection) can make
even the task of identifying a data user’s location exceedingly difficult, let alone
the user’s citizenship or depth of connection to the United States.9 While
similar identification problems occur in the world of tangible property, the
ubiquitous and intermingled nature of data compounds the problem of
identification in both degree and kind. This problem is particularly acute in the
context of mass surveillance, where the sheer quantity of data collected
necessitates the use of presumptions as a basis for establishing identity. The
vast quantity of data collected means that even a low error rate will yield large
quantities of data associated with misidentified users.
This Article takes up the challenge that data—in particular its mobility,
interconnectedness, and divisibility—poses to territoriality doctrine and its
focus on user identity. To be clear from the outset, I do not purport to provide
all of the answers, a task that requires far more than a single article. Rather, the
aim of this Article is threefold: first, to expose the fiction of territoriality in a
world of highly mobile, intermingled, and divisible data; second, to highlight
flaws in the territoriality doctrine; and third, to suggest alternative approaches
to thinking about the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the rules governing the

8.

See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“‘[T]he people’ protected
by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.”).

9.

See, e.g., Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI’s Search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect in Bomb
Threats, Highlights Use of Malware for Surveillance, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11e3-9e2c
-e1d01116fd98_story.html [http://perma.cc/JZ2T-CPHW] (describing the difficulty of
determining the identity and location of a known Internet user); Letter from Mythili
Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Reena
Raggi, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Criminal Rules 2 (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www
.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-letter-to-committee-.pdf
[http://
perma.cc/MC3X-RPYH] (describing the increased use of sophisticated anonymization
technologies).
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acquisition of foreign intelligence information, and the territorial limits on law
enforcement jurisdiction.
In so doing, this Article fills an important gap in the literature. While there
was, beginning in the 1990s, a surge of scholarship on the borderless Internet’s
effect on sovereignty, the literature focused largely on private law (such as ecommerce and trademarks) and associated regulatory issues.10 In contrast,
scholarly literature has devoted comparatively little attention to the
constitutional and sovereignty implications of the government reaching or
sending its agents across borders to search and seize. Orin Kerr offers perhaps
the most sustained attention to the issue, but he does so while focusing
primarily on border searches and with the goal of maintaining the Fourth
Amendment’s territorial-based distinctions.11 I, by contrast, argue that data
challenges territoriality doctrine at its core, requiring us to reconsider—and in
some cases reject—the territorial-based distinctions as they apply to the search
and seizure of digital data.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins by analyzing the
longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality, examining its dominant
(and often confused) constitutional, statutory, and jurisdictional applications.
It explores the underpinnings of the now-dominant view that only certain
“people”—namely U.S. citizens, noncitizens with substantial voluntary
connections to the United States, and those physically present in the United
States—are entitled to Fourth Amendment rights and heightened statutory
protections with respect to foreign intelligence surveillance.

10.

See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 311 (2002); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Peter P. Swire, Elephants and Mice Revisited: Law
and Choice of Law on the Internet, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1975 (2005). There is, of course, also a
wealth of literature on the related issues regarding the relationship between new technology
and privacy. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012); William C. Banks, Programmatic
Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633 (2010); David Gray &
Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); Orin S. Kerr,
The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution,
102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, New Technologies]; Orin S. Kerr, The Next
Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr, The
Next Generation]; Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 343 (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011). But this literature
tends to avoid any sustained discussion of territorial-based considerations.

11.

See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 285-86
(2015).
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This Part also highlights the very different purposes that territoriality
serves within the context of the Fourth Amendment doctrine (and, by
extension, surveillance law) and within the context of warrant jurisdiction. The
Fourth Amendment imposes restrictions on the government’s authority to
search and seize; by contrast, warrants provide the government the affirmative
authorization to do so. Thus, whereas territoriality for Fourth Amendment
purposes is based on an understanding of who is entitled to privacy rights visà-vis the U.S. government, territorial-based limits on warrant jurisdiction are
based on respect for other nations’ sovereignty coupled with pragmatic
concerns about the difficulty of unilaterally enforcing a warrant within another
nation’s borders.
Part II highlights the ways in which data challenges key underlying
presumptions about territoriality across each of these areas of the law. This
Part identifies central differences between data and its tangible counterparts,
focusing in particular on data’s mobility, divisibility, and interconnectedness. It
also examines the location independence of data and its user, referring to the
user’s lack of knowledge or explicit choice as to the location of his or her data at
any given moment.
Finally, Part III argues that these differences between data and its tangible
counterparts matter, but in the exact opposite way from what the government
has suggested. These differences both compel a rethinking of a territorial
Fourth Amendment and highlight the dangers of unilateral, extraterritorial law
enforcement that data enables. More specifically, I argue that the intermingling
and mobility of data mean that territorial and identity-based distinctions at the
heart of the Fourth Amendment and the statutory scheme governing foreign
intelligence surveillance no longer serve the interests they are designed to
protect, at least as applied to the acquisition (or seizure) of data. Large
quantities of protected persons’ data are being incidentally collected under the
much more permissive rules governing the collection of nonprotected persons’
information. In their current form, these rules no longer provide the kind of
protections for U.S. citizens and those located within the United States that
they were designed to ensure. This discrepancy calls for a rethinking of the
Fourth Amendment’s reach.
The mobility and divisibility of data similarly expose the problems with a
territorially limited warrant authority that turns on where data happens to be
located at any given point in time. However, the kind of unilateral,
extraterritorial exercise of law enforcement that the government advocates in
the Microsoft case imposes its own set of costs. Among other problems, it
encourages the balkanization of the Internet into multiple, closed-off systems
protected from the extraterritorial reach of foreign-based ISPs, which imposes
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significant costs on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Internet.12 Such an
approach also makes it hard to object when another country—say, China or
Russia—seeks to compel the foreign-based subsidiary of a U.S.-based ISP to
turn over e-mails and other data stored in the United States, including data of
U.S. citizens.13 Thus, while this Article recognizes, and in fact embraces, the
need for new norms and procedures in response to cross-border data flows, it
argues that this is not something that should be unilaterally imposed. Rather,
the executive branch should work with its foreign partners to develop
improved, mutually agreeable mechanisms that would enable law enforcement,
pursuant to appropriate procedural and substantive requirements, to access
data irrespective of where it is stored.
i. t e r r it o r ia l p r e s u m p t io n s
Increasing global interconnectedness has prompted renewed attention to
the validity and effect of territorial presumptions in law. In a variety of
contexts, both U.S. federal courts and the executive branch have sought to
define and limit the geographic reach of statutes, constitutional provisions, and
international treaty obligations.14 With some notable exceptions—including
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene v. Bush15 that the Suspension Clause
extends to Guantanamo Bay detainees—the recent trend has been one of
entrenchment, with territorial-based presumptions waxing, not waning. Just
five years ago, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
upended longstanding assumptions about the reach of U.S. securities law in
12.

Conversely, Microsoft’s position also encourages a different form of data localization,
pursuant to which nations require that their citizens’ or residents’ data be stored locally in
order to ensure local law enforcement access. This too impairs the efficiency of the Internet
and, while perhaps not as costly as the creation of fully closed-off systems, is more likely to
come to fruition. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, The Microsoft Warrant Case: The Policy Issues,
JUST SECURITY (Sept. 8, 2015, 12:48 PM), http://www.justsecurity.org/25901/microsoft
-warrant-case-policy-issues [http://perma.cc/K394-URVS]; Ilya Khrennikov & Anastasia
Ustinova, Putin’s Next Invasion? The Russian Web, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May
1, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-05-01/russia-moves-toward-china
-style-internet-censorship [http://perma.cc/PHX3-NWX4]. See also infra Section III.C.

13.

See Oral Argument Transcript, 2d Cir., Microsoft, supra note 2, at 54-56, 58 (transcribing the
government’s claim that it is the “norm” for a German court to require a provider in
Germany to turn over data wherever it is located, including the United States).

14.

See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; see also Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d
117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (applying strict, formalistic limits to the
extraterritorial application of Fourth Amendment rights), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-118
(U.S. July 27, 2015).

15.

553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled, as a matter of
constitutional law, to bring habeas petitions challenging their ongoing detention).
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order to fortify the presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutory law.16 In a unanimous opinion three years later, the Court applied the
presumption to limit the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute.17
Meanwhile, the executive branch has recently undertaken its own searching
inquiry into the geographic reach of key international law obligations, rejecting
arguments that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has
extraterritorial application.18 And while the Obama Administration has sought
to extend certain protections to nonresident aliens in the contexts of foreign
intelligence surveillance and targeted uses of lethal force, it has done so as a
matter of policy, not law.19 The law continues to depend on a complicated set of
territorial presumptions and applications—all of which depend, at their core,
on the ability to define the relevant “here” and “there” and a determination that
the “here” and “there” matter.20
This Part sets the stage for the argument that follows. It describes key
constitutional, statutory, and international law presumptions of territoriality

16.

561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.”).

17.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). For interesting commentary, see
Sarah H. Cleveland, Commentary, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 8 (2013); and Louise Weinberg, What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk
About Extraterritoriality: Kiobel and the Conflict of Laws, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1471 (2014).

18.

See Charlie Savage, U.S., Rebuffing U.N., Maintains Stance that Rights Treaty Does Not Apply
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/14/world/us-affirms
-stance-that-rights-treaty-doesnt-apply-abroad.html
[http://perma.cc/9WQW-2PHF];
Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State,
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/state-department
-iccpr-memo.pdf [http://perma.cc/BQ39-FUKH]; cf. Press Release, White House,
Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the U.S. Presentation to the
Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
-office/2014/11/12/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-us-presentation-commit
tee-a [http://perma.cc/R3XK-5MJH] (announcing the Administration’s conclusion that
Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture, “which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment,” has extraterritorial application in any place that the “U.S.
government controls as a governmental authority”).

19.

See, e.g., Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for
the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of
Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23
/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism [http://perma
.cc/WWQ7-GAVQ]; Press Release, White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals
Intelligence Activities § 4 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014
/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities
[http://perma.cc/EN7Z
-YPED] [hereinafter PPD-28].

20.

Cf. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (grappling with the question as to which conduct mattered for
purposes of applying the territorial presumption).
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embedded in the Fourth Amendment, the statutory surveillance scheme, and
warrant jurisdiction. As this Part highlights, the rules are based on two key
premises. First, U.S. citizens and others with substantial connections to the
United States are, as a matter of both constitutional law and policy, entitled to
greater privacy protections than noncitizens who lack substantial connections
to the United States. And second, respect for other states’ sovereignty,
concerns about international comity, and practical impediments to
extraterritorial law enforcement actions limit the extraterritorial reach of
warrants.
Notably, case law and commentary have also generally assumed—usually
without analysis—that the locus for assessing territoriality is that of the person
or property being searched or seized. Cases involving compelled process
pursuant to the government’s subpoena power—along with the lower courts’
opinions in the Microsoft case—provide some of the few examples to the
contrary.21
A. The Territorial Fourth Amendment
Until the 1950s, it was widely assumed that the Bill of Rights did not apply
outside the nation’s territorial borders, even when the United States was
criminally prosecuting its own citizens in a foreign territory.22 Under the thenprevalent understanding of the Constitution’s reach, constitutional rights had
full effect within the nation’s borders, but generally not elsewhere.23 In fact,

21.

See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of N.S., 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984)
(holding that a bank operating in the United States was obliged to produce financial
documents located in the Cayman Islands in response to a grand jury subpoena); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983)
(emphasizing that “[t]he test for the production of documents [in response to a grand jury
subpoena] is control, not location” and that, as a result, a witness may not resist production
“on the ground that the documents are located abroad”); supra notes 1-2 and accompanying
text.

22.

See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that jury-trial rights did not apply in the
prosecution of a capital crime by a U.S. consul in Japan). Conversely, actions taken within
the United States were generally deemed covered by the Constitution’s protections,
irrespective of the target of the action. Cf. Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 361 F.2d
106, 111 (2d Cir. 1966) (“The Government’s [argument] that ‘The Constitution of the
United States confers no rights on non-resident aliens’ is so patently erroneous in a case
involving property in the United States that we are surprised it was made.”).

23.

See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909, 918-19 (1991). But see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a
Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 493-97 (2007) (describing select exceptions to strict
territoriality prior to 1957).
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even as the United States acquired new lands, only those territories that were
“incorporated” within the United States (i.e., those destined for statehood)
were protected by the entirety of the Bill of Rights. “Unincorporated”
territories were protected by “fundamental” rights only.24
By 1957, the Constitution’s territorial limits with respect to U.S. citizens
began to crumble. After initially ruling—consistent with longstanding
doctrine—that citizen-dependents of servicemembers overseas were not
entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, the Supreme Court
granted a rehearing and reversed itself the following Term.25 Writing for a
plurality in Reid v. Covert, Justice Black stated, “[W]e reject the idea that when
the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. . . . It can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”26
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred, albeit on narrower grounds,
restricting their analysis to the facts of the case; specifically, they centered their
analysis on the fact that the case involved a capital murder.27
At the time, a number of scholars proclaimed (or at least advocated for) a
new era of constitutional universalism in which the government would be

24.

Territories destined for statehood were deemed “incorporated” into the United States,
whereas territories that were not slated to become states were “unincorporated” and thus
“not a part of the United States.” Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901); id. at 342
(White, J., concurring). Fundamental rights were understood at the time to include those
“inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government . . . .
[They are] restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed . . . .” Id.
at 291. These fundamental rights were further defined to include due process rights but not
“artificial or remedial” rights, such as jury-trial rights. Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922) (noting that “[t]he guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights
declared in the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, had from the beginning full application” in the
territories); Downes, 182 U.S. at 282-83. But see Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 984 (2009)
(asserting that the difference between incorporated and unincorporated territories with
respect to the application of constitutional rights has been overstated by courts and
commentators).

25.

See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S 487 (1956). The Court
granted rehearing in both cases, 352 U.S. 901 (1956), and ultimately overruled them in Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).

26.

354 U.S. at 5-6.

27.

Id. at 41-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 65-78 (Harlan, J., concurring). Three years
later, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented in a case that extended the jury trial
protections to citizen-dependents in a noncapital case. See McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 234, 249-77 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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bound by the Bill of Rights, regardless of where or upon whom it was acting.28
But in its 1990 ruling in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court
rejected this argument.29
The Verdugo-Urquidez case addressed the constitutionality of a warrantless
search of captured drug lord Rene Verdugo-Urquidez’s residence in Mexico by
U.S. agents. Verdugo-Urquidez was in U.S. custody in California at the time of
the search. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit ruled that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment. But a fractured Supreme Court reversed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist—on behalf of himself and Justices White, O’Connor,
and Scalia—concluded that Verdugo-Urquidez, as a non-resident alien, was
not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. According to Justice
Rehnquist, the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the people”30 was a term of
art referring to the “class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community.”31 Verdugo-Urquidez needed to have
developed a “sufficient connection” to the United States in order to receive the
Fourth Amendment’s protection; two days in a U.S. jail could not suffice.32 In
so holding, the Court made the search location and the target’s identity the key
determinants of the Fourth Amendment’s reach.
28.

See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985) (“The compact applies to
everything done by the community and its officials, in the United States and elsewhere,
affecting citizens and aliens alike, and concerning immigration no less than other matters.”);
Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 879 (1989) (“The separation of
the international from the domestic legal order, upon which the denial of constitutional
rights to aliens is based, is breaking down.”); cf. Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on
the Struggle Against International Terrorism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN.
L. REV. 831 (1987) (opposing the universalist push).

29.

494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).

30.

The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.

31.

494 U.S. at 265. In so holding, the Court adopted what Gerald Neuman labels a
“membership” theory of constitutional rights. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 6-7 (1996) (defining the
membership theory to mean that only the “beneficiaries” of the social contract are entitled to
constitutional rights protections); see also Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE
J. INT’L L. 55, 57 (2011) (defining this approach as the “compact” model).

32.

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 271-72. For a fuller analysis of the Verdugo-Urquidez
ruling and its implications, see Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Seizures: The Constitution and
Criminal Procedure Abroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM ACROSS BORDERS IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST TERRORISM (Federico Fabbrini & Vicki Jackson eds., forthcoming 2016).
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Justice Kennedy provided the critical fifth vote. But while purporting to
join Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, Justice Kennedy repudiated the
majority’s central theory. Specifically, he rejected the assertion that the Fourth
Amendment’s reference to “the people” was a term of art referring exclusively
to U.S. citizens and those with sufficient connections to the United States.
Justice Kennedy instead argued that the reference to “the people” was of
unclear import and could just as readily “be interpreted to underscore the
importance of the right, rather than to restrict the category of persons who may
assert it.”33 However, he too rejected a universalist approach to constitutional
rights—emphasizing “the undoubted proposition that the Constitution does
not create, nor do general principles of law create, any juridical relation
between our country and some undefined, limitless class of noncitizens who
are beyond our territory.”34 Justice Kennedy instead advocated a pragmatic
approach to the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights. According
to Justice Kennedy, it would be “impracticable and anomalous” to enforce the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a foreign search of
a nonresident alien.35 Thus, the warrantless searches of Verdugo-Urquidez’s
Mexican residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment.36
Despite the splintered analysis, Verdugo-Urquidez now stands for the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not constrain the United States
when its agents search or seize a noncitizen outside the United States, unless
the noncitizen has developed a “significant voluntary connection” with the

33.

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that the Framers’ primary
concern was to protect natural rights and thereby rejecting the attempt to “restrict[] the
application of the fourth amendment to any special class of people”), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259.

34.

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

35.

Id. at 278. This part of the opinion draws directly on Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid.
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the
extraterritorial reach of constitutional rights should depend on practical and functional
considerations, such as the “local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives,” and that the key test was whether “adherence to a specific guarantee [would
be] altogether impracticable and anomalous”).

36.

494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Kennedy focused his analysis on
the impracticability of applying the warrant requirement to an extraterritorial search or
seizure, saying nothing about the feasibility and practicability of applying the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to extraterritorial searches and seizures. Justice
Kennedy also failed to address the possibility that a warrant requirement could operate
simply as a means to ensure that the requisite U.S. standards had been met (probable cause
and a review by a neutral magistrate) without also providing the affirmative authorization to
search or seize (which would need to be separately granted by the Mexican government).
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United States.37 Conversely, while the Supreme Court has not squarely
addressed the question of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights abroad, lower
courts have concluded that U.S. actions against citizens located
extraterritorially are subject to the Fourth Amendment but that only the
reasonableness test—and not the warrant requirement—applies.38 Stated
another way, government extraterritorial actions vis-à-vis U.S. citizens or other
persons with sufficient connections to the United States have to be
“reasonable,” a standard that is generally determined by weighing the
government and private interests at stake. But the government need not obtain
a warrant based on a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, as is the default
requirement when the government searches or seizes on U.S. soil.39
Verdugo-Urquidez thus established a two-step decision tree. First, where
does the search or seizure take place? If in the United States, the Fourth
Amendment applies.40 If outside the United States, then turn to the question of

37.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam) (applying the “sufficient voluntary connection” standard from Verdugo-Urquidez
and finding no “sufficient voluntary connection” where the victim was an “alien who . . .
was not in[] the United States when the incident occurred”), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-118
(U.S. July 27, 2015).

38.

See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying a
reasonableness test to the extraterritorial search of a citizen’s property); In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (also applying a
reasonableness test); see also United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490-91 (9th Cir. 1987)
(also applying a reasonableness test, but adopting a slightly different definition of
reasonableness that depends on adherence to foreign law); cf. In re Directives [redacted text]
Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (alteration in original) (suggesting that the warrant clause applies, but
is subject to a “foreign intelligence exception”).

39.

That said, even when the government searches or seizes a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil, there are
a host of exceptions to the warrant requirement that may apply. See Warrantless Searches and
Seizures, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 48 (2015) (detailing the many exceptions to the
warrant requirement that apply even when the government is conducting a search or seizure
on U.S. soil). For an interesting debate as to what the Fourth Amendment historically
required, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757
(1994), which argues against the presumptive warrant requirement, even as applied to the
search and seizure of U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, and elucidates a theory of reasonableness;
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 571-90
(1999), which critiques Akhil Amar’s account of the historical record in support of a
reasonableness test; and Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse
than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994), which also critiques Amar’s position, largely on
historical, normative, and policy grounds.

40.

Some courts have relied on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s language in Verdugo-Urquidez to
suggest that even within the United States, only U.S. citizens and aliens with substantial
voluntary connections are entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. See, e.g., United
States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260-61, 1273 (D. Utah 2003) (holding
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identity: is the target of the search or seizure a U.S. citizen or an alien with
substantial voluntary connections to the United States? If yes, then the Fourth
Amendment applies, and the test is one of reasonableness. If, on the other
hand, the target is a noncitizen lacking substantial connections to the United
States, the Fourth Amendment does not apply, and the government need not
abide by even the minimal requirement of reasonableness.
Moreover, while the 2008 ruling in Boumediene v. Bush41—in which the
Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause protected aliens at
Guantanamo Bay—precipitated new proclamations of an emergent
constitutional universalism,42 this universalism has not yet materialized. To the
contrary, lower courts have largely restricted Boumediene’s holding to the
Suspension Clause and possibly other so-called “structural” provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause.43 Courts continue to rely on
that a previously deported felon present in the United States is not entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections); cf. United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 978 (4th Cir.
2012) (relying, in part, on Verdugo-Urquidez to conclude that illegal aliens are not entitled to
Second Amendment rights). But the extension of the opinion in such a way is a minority
view. Moreover, Rehnquist himself described the holding as addressing the extraterritorial
application of Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
274 (1990) (“We think that the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history, and our cases
discussing the application of the Constitution to aliens and extraterritorially require rejection
of respondent’s claim.” (emphasis added)).
41.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

42.

See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 225, 230 (2010) (suggesting that Boumediene marked a change in U.S.
jurisprudence); David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and
Guantanamo Bay, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 61 (describing the Supreme Court as
having rejected “outmoded claims about sovereignty, territoriality, and rights”); Gerald L.
Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259,
290 (2009) (describing the Boumediene opinion as a “repudiation of the Verdugo-Urquidez
plurality” and providing a new path of jurisprudence). For a similar perspective from those
critical of what Boumediene might portend, see Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the
Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 103 (2011), which
pronounces Boumediene “an enormously significant inflection point in U.S. constitutional
law” and states that the Supreme Court “erred” in 2008 when the case was decided; and Eric
A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 24-25, which criticizes an emerging “judicial cosmopolitanism.”

43.

See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the ex post facto clause, like the
suspension clause, “serves as a meaningful structural constraint imposed by Article I that
goes ‘to the very root of the power of Congress to act [at] all’” (citations omitted)); Brief for
Respondent at 64, Al Bahlul, 767 F.3d 1 (No. 11–1324), 2013 WL 3479237, at *64 (relying in
part on the ex post facto’s “structural function in U.S. law” as a basis for conceding that it
applies to military commission prosecutions of aliens in Guantanamo); RAUSTIALA, supra
note 23, at 244 (“Structural provisions, such as bans on title of nobility, are arguably
different [from individual-rights provisions]. Because they determine the scope of federal
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Verdugo-Urquidez as a basis for concluding that noncitizens without substantial
connections to the United States lack Fourth Amendment and other so-called
“individual” rights.44 In fact, it even remains unsettled whether Guantanamo
detainees are entitled to basic rights—as distinct from the Suspension Clause—
protections.45
But this is not the only way to think about the Fourth Amendment. As
described above, Justice Kennedy, for example, suggests that the term “the
people” is meant to emphasize the importance of the right, rather than limit its
application to a certain class.46 David Gray, also relying on the term “the
people,” persuasively suggests that the term defines a collective right.47 Relying
on both textual and historical analysis, Gray argues that the term “the people”
power, they apply everywhere the federal government acts.”); infra text accompanying notes
44-45.
44.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam)
(holding that an alien fifteen-year-old shot just over the Mexican border lacks fourth
amendment rights given his lack of substantial connections to the United States), petition for
cert. filed, No. 15-118 (U.S. July 27, 2015); United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331-32
(11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a noncitizen and resident of the Bahamas without
substantial voluntary connections to the United States lacks fourth amendment rights);
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that “the Court in Boumediene
disclaimed any intention to disturb existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any
constitutional provisions, other than the Suspension Clause”); see also Ibrahim v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (ruling that a noncitizen could raise first
and fifth Amendment claims because she had developed “significant voluntary connections”
with the United States); Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(concluding that an alien lacking a sufficient connection to the United States was not
entitled to relief under the takings clause); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F.
2012) (holding that an alien working as a civilian contractor in Iraq is not entitled to jury
trial rights). But see Rodriguez v. Swartz, No. 14 Civ. 02251 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2015) (relying in
significant part on the functionalist approach of Boumediene to conclude—in direct
repudiation of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hernandez—that an alien shot just over the
border in Mexico is entitled to the protections of the fourth amendment).

45.

See, e.g., Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (asserting that
“detainees [at Guantanamo Bay] possess no constitutional due process rights” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United
States v. Hamdan, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1322 (C.M. Comm’n R. 2011), rev’d on other grounds,
696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012). But see Brief for Respondent at 82-83, Al Bahlul v. United
States, No. 11-1342, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1324), 2012 WL 1743629, at
*82-83 (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Guantanamo Bay
detainees are entitled to due process rights and assuming, arguendo, that they are in fact
covered).

46.

See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

47.

See David C. Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 21), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2588739 [http://
perma.cc/W35Z-L6J7] (“[T]he Fourth Amendment should . . . be read as referring to
collective rights of ‘the people’ rather than individual rights of each ‘person’ or ‘subject.’”).
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was chosen to emphasize the collective political interest in being free from
unreasonable searches or seizures: “Whenever a member of ‘the people’
challenges a governmental search or seizure, she therefore stands not only for
herself, but for ‘the people’ as a whole.”48 To be sure, the import of Gray’s
insight depends in part on how “the people” is defined.49 But even assuming a
narrow definition of “the people” as limited to U.S. citizens and those with
significant voluntary connections to the United States, Gray’s approach moves
us away from an individualistic focus on the particular target of the
government action—i.e., the idea that Jack has not suffered a Fourth
Amendment violation when evidence against him is obtained in the process of
illegally searching his friend Jill—to a broader focus on the implication of a
particular search on ‘the people’ as a whole. I return to this issue in Part III.
For now, it is worth emphasizing one other notable aspect of VerdugoUrquidez. Specifically, Verdugo-Urquidez highlights the longstanding
assumption that the locus of the territoriality inquiry turns on the location of
the thing being searched or seized. The search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s
residence took place in Mexico while he was being held in the United States.50
Throughout the case, it was simply assumed, without discussion, that the
search was extraterritorial, not territorial.51 What mattered was the location of
the property being searched, not the location of the property’s owner or the
agent performing the search.
B. Territorial-Based Surveillance Authorities
The current statutory and regulatory regime governing foreign intelligence
surveillance adopts the Fourth Amendment’s focus on location and nationality
as determinative of the rules that apply.52 But this was not always the case.
Initially passed in 1978, FISA regulates the collection of electronic
communications for foreign intelligence purposes.53 The 1978 version of FISA

48.

Id. (manuscript at 25); see also id. (manuscript at 22) (arguing that the term “the people”
“bespeaks an understanding that security from unreasonable search and seizure is linked to
collective projects of governance and politics”).

49.

See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

50.

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990).

51.

Id. at 274-75.

52.

A quick word on terminology: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (the primary
focus of this Section) refers to the “acquisition” of electronic communications to describe
what is colloquially understood as the “collection” of such information. I use these terms
interchangeably.
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covered, among other things, the collection of wire and radio communications
of persons based in the United States, as well as territorial-based acquisitions
of international wire communications when the targeted communication was
to or from a person within the United States.54 With a few narrow exceptions,
all such collection required a warrant issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), based on a finding that the target was a “foreign
power” or an “agent of a foreign power.”55
Notably, the warrant requirement applied to citizens and noncitizens alike,
albeit with heightened standards governing the targeting of a “United States
person” (i.e., a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident).56 At the time of
passage, some members of Congress argued that the warrant requirement
should cover U.S. persons only—not resident aliens who were not legal
permanent residents or nonresident aliens whose communications were
covered by FISA when the collection took place in the United States.57 But
Congress ultimately decided to apply the warrant requirement to all such
collection. The House Intelligence Committee emphasized that a broad
warrant requirement was imposed “not . . . primarily to protect such persons
but rather to protect U.S. citizens who may be involved with them and to
ensure that the safeguards inherent in a judicial warrant cannot be avoided by a
determination as to a person’s citizenship.”58
This quote exemplifies the 1978 Congress’s prescient understanding of two
important facts. First, the acquisition of non-U.S. persons’ communications
could yield the incidental collection of U.S. persons’ information. The aptness
of this insight has only increased over time. When Congress passed FISA in
1978, most communications were wholly domestic. In other words,
53.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). FISA also regulates physical searches targeting
foreign powers and agents of foreign powers, pen register and trap device surveillance, and
judicially compelled productions of tangible things. This Article is primarily focused on
electronic surveillance.

54.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2012). For an excellent and detailed explanation of FISA’s scope, see
DAVID KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS §§ 7:2-16 (2d ed. 2012).

55.

50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A); see also id. § 1802 (defining the circumstances in which the
executive branch could authorize territorial electronic surveillance without a court order).

56.

Id. § 1801(i). The definition of “U.S. persons” also includes unincorporated associations in
which a “substantial number” of members are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents,
and most corporations incorporated in the United States. Id.; see also id. § 1801(b) (defining
what it means to be an “agent of a foreign power” differently for U.S. persons and non-U.S.
persons).

57.

H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 26 (1978).

58.

Id.
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communications transpired primarily between two or more U.S.-based users
and involved data that did not leave the territorial boundaries of the United
States. This is no longer true. Now the Internet is “truly global,” with
communications often involving at least one foreign-based sender or recipient
and regularly transiting in and out of the nation’s boundaries.59 When the
government acquires communications of non-U.S. persons, whether located
territorially or extraterritorially, it also risks scooping up a significant amount
of U.S. persons’ data.
Second, a universally applicable warrant requirement protected against
erroneous citizenship determinations that would otherwise result in the
warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens. In other words, Congress demanded a
warrant for the acquisition of non-U.S. persons’ information not because it
was interested in protecting non-U.S. persons’ privacy, but as a means of
protecting U.S. persons.
In 2008, however, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(FAA) and made two key changes to FISA. First, the FAA extended FISA’s
warrant coverage to the surveillance of U.S. persons located outside the United
States, thereby bringing the extraterritorial surveillance of U.S. persons under
FISA’s statutory scheme.60 Second, Congress eliminated the warrant and
probable cause requirements for the domestic acquisition of electronic
communications sent by extraterritorially located, non-U.S. person targets. In
doing so, the 2008 Congress disregarded the insight of the 1978 Congress
about the risk of intermingled data and erroneous targeting decisions.
In broad brushstrokes, territorial-based presumptions now operate along
two axes. The first axis—the targeting of persons located inside the United
States, as well as U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents wherever they are
located (so-called “U.S. persons”)—is subject to more rigorous standards and
procedural protections than the targeting of noncitizens located outside the
United States. The second axis—the collection of data located within the
United States—is generally subject to heightened restrictions compared to

59.

See, e.g., Kerr, The Next Generation, supra note 10, at 404-06 (describing the evolution of the
Internet from the early 1980s to 2014).

60.

FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §§ 703-704, 122 Stat. 2436, 2448-57
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881b-1881c (2012)). Protections for U.S. persons located
extraterritorially were first added as an amendment to the then-pending version of the
legislation in October 2007, adopted by the Senate Intelligence Committee by a fairly
narrow vote of nine to six. See Jonathan W. Gannon, From Executive Order to Judicial
Approval: Tracing the History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism
Investigations, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 59, 80-85 (2012) (tracking the legislative history of
U.S. person provisions in the FAA).
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collection that takes place outside the United States.61 The scheme thus tracks
the territorial-based line drawing of the Fourth Amendment, albeit with an
added focus on target location, in addition to property location and target
identity.
More specifically, the FISC must approve the targeted electronic
surveillance of all persons in the United States as well as all U.S. persons
outside the United States, based on a finding of probable cause that the
requisite targeting standard has been met. This requires finding that the target
is a “foreign power,” an “agent of a foreign power,” or, for U.S. persons located
outside the United States, an “employee or officer of a foreign power” (an
addition meant to cover those working for foreign governments or foreign
government-owned companies).62
Conversely, electronic surveillance targeting non-U.S. persons located
outside the United States—what is known as “702” surveillance based on the
statutory provision in the FAA63—is now permitted without a warrant, a
finding of probable cause, or even a requirement that the target be a foreign
power, agent, or employee of a foreign power.64 Rather, it is the Attorney
General and the Director of National Intelligence—not the FISC—who jointly
authorize the targeting of noncitizens “reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information,” subject
to certain statutory limitations.65
61.

The details are, of course, more complicated; not all types of electronic surveillance fit neatly
into this general schema. See, e.g., KRIS & WILSON, supra note 54, § 17:17; Jonathan Mayer,
Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales from the FISA Frontier, WEB POL’Y
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil [http://perma.cc
/7FES-DYJM].

62.

Rules governing the surveillance of persons in the United States (which requires a warrant
based on a finding of probable cause) also vary depending on whether the target is a U.S.
person or non-U.S. person. For example, the definition of “agent of a foreign power” is
broader for non-U.S. persons than U.S. persons, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2012); the type of
information that can be sought is broader for non-U.S. persons than U.S. persons, see id. §
1801(e) (defining “foreign intelligence information” differently for U.S. persons and nonU.S. persons); and the duration of permitted acquisition is longer for non-U.S. persons, see
id. § 1805(d)(1). Required minimization procedures, which limit the acquisition and
dissemination of nonrelevant information, apply to U.S. persons only. See id. § 1801(h).
That said, Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28), issued on January 17, 2014, stated that,
as a matter of policy, intelligence agencies must eliminate, where possible, differences in the
dissemination and retention rules governing U.S. persons’ and non-U.S. persons’
information. See PPD-28, supra note 19, § 4.

63.

FISA Amendments Act § 702.

64.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a); Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International
Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015).

65.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
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The FISC’s role is limited to three tasks with respect to 702 surveillance.
First, the FISC reviews the joint “certification” issued by the Attorney General
and Director of National Intelligence to ensure it contains all the requisite
elements.66 Second, the FISC reviews whether the targeting procedures are
“reasonably designed” to target those “reasonably believed” to be outside the
United States and to prevent the acquisition of communications in which the
sender and all recipients are U.S.-based.67 And third, the FISC reviews
minimization procedures—designed to limit the acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of information involving U.S. persons—to assess whether they
meet statutory requirements.68 The FISC has no role in reviewing each specific
targeting decision.
In practice, a National Security Agency (NSA) analyst initiates targeting
upon a determination that a particular person may possess or receive the kind
of foreign intelligence information covered within one of the approved
certifications. (The FBI or CIA can nominate targets, but it is the NSA that
makes the ultimate targeting decision.) The analyst then engages in a
“foreignness determination”—namely, a totality of the circumstances
determination that the target is a non-U.S. person “reasonably believed” to be
located outside the United States.69 Because a target’s identity is not always
known, the NSA applies certain presumptions. For example, when a target’s
location is either unknown or known to be outside the United States, the target
is treated as a non-U.S. person absent a “reasonable belief” that such person is
a U.S. person.70 These presumptions, however, are hardly foolproof, as there

66.

See id. §§ 1881a(i)(2)(A), 1881a(g) (describing the certification requirement). Approved
certifications reportedly authorize, among other things, the acquisition of information
concerning international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. See Report on the
Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD 25 & n.71 (July 2, 2014), http://www.pclob.gov
/library/702-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7SG-HJLZ].

67.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(2)(B).

68.

Id. § 1881a(i)(2)(C).

69.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 43-45.

70.

Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of
Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, as Amended, OFF. DIRECTOR NAT’L INTELLIGENCE § 2(k)(2) (Oct. 31,
2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by
%20NSA%20in%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf [http://perma.cc
/AEZ6-DFCR]. According to Raj De, then-General Counsel of the NSA, any “contrary”
evidence must be considered, but the ultimate test is “totality of the circumstances.” Public
Hearing Regarding the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD 40-41 (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.pclob.gov/library/20140319-Transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5G3-KEBW]; see
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are many reasons why a U.S. person might be temporarily or permanently
located outside of the United States. While the Department of Justice (DOJ)
reports that the error rate is quite low—just 0.4% in a review of 2011 data71 —
such statistics obviously only include identified errors and do not tell us
anything about unknown errors. Moreover, given the sheer quantity of data
that is currently being collected, even a low rate of error can yield high
numbers of erroneous “foreignness” assessments.
Once a target is identified, the NSA then approves “selectors” associated
with the target—i.e., an e-mail account such as “johnsmith@gmail.com” used
by the target. In NSA speak, this is known as the “tasked selector”72 and
effectively serves as the search term for collection and/or review of the acquired
data. It is possible to have multiple selectors associated with each target.73
There are reportedly two main collection programs pursuant to section
702: PRISM collection and upstream collection. With PRISM collection, the
government sends approved selectors, such as e-mail addresses associated with
the targeted persons, to an electronic communications service provider, such as
an ISP. The ISP must then turn over all communications sent to or from the
selector to the NSA.74 As of mid-2011, approximately ninety percent of all
communications collected pursuant to section 702 were obtained through
PRISM—yielding an estimated two hundred twenty-five million Internet
communications each year.75
also Donohue, supra note 64 (describing foreignness determination under section 702);
PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 43-45.
71.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 44. These statistics do not include data
obtained pursuant to Executive Order 12,333 and do not include instances in which the DOJ
correctly determined that the target was a non-U.S. person located outside the United
States, but the target subsequently traveled to the United States and section 702 collection
nonetheless (impermissibly) continued.

72.

See Dir. of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Section 702, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY 5 (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nsa
.gov/civil_liberties/_files/nsa_report_on_section_702_program.pdf [http://perma.cc/28W6
-AKA3].

73.

See, e.g., Calendar Year 2014 Transparency Report: Statistical Transparency Report Regarding
Use of National Security Authorities—Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2014, OFF. DIRECTOR
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 22, 2015), http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/transparency/odni
_transparencyreport_cy2014 [http://perma.cc/VX5E-TFAC] (noting that a single target may
be using multiple e-mail accounts, each of which is a different selector).

74.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 7. The NSA receives all data collected
through PRISM, and the CIA and FBI each receive a portion of such data. Id. at 34.

75.

Memorandum Opinion, [Caption Redacted], [Docket No. Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at
*9, *25 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (alteration in original) (referring to the fact that the NSA
acquires “more than two hundred fifty million Internet communications each year
pursuant to Section 702,” and that approximately ninety-one percent of these
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Upstream collection, by contrast, involves the acquisition of data from the
Internet’s “backbone”—the fiber-optic cables over which Internet
communications travel.76 Whereas collection through the PRISM program is
done with the assistance of the ISP or phone service providers with whom the
target interacts, “upstream” collection is done with the assistance of the
Internet and telecommunications companies that control the fiber-optic cables
over which a target’s communications travel. As with PRISM, the government
sends a list of approved selectors to the relevant companies. Because of the way
the technology operates, acquisition generally involves the gathering of socalled Internet “transactions.” Such transactions are sometimes comprised of
individual discrete communications and sometimes include multiple
communications bundled together.77 Transactions are first screened to
eliminate what are known as “wholly domestic communications,” defined to
include transactions in which the sender and all recipients are located within
the United States.78 Then, the transactions are screened to determine whether
they contain the tasked selector.79
There are three points worth noting about upstream collection. First, as
just described, the screening requires the NSA to eliminate only those
communications in which the sender and recipients are “known” to be located
in the United States. However, in many cases the location of the sender and
recipient are unknown. Moreover, even if the filtering tools employed by the

communications are acquired directly from ISPs through the PRISM program); Letter from
Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, and
Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, to
Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, and Saxby Chambliss, Vice Chairman, Select Comm.
on Intelligence, U.S. Senate 4 (May 4, 2012) http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20Ranking%20Member%20Rupp
ersberger_Scan.pdf [http://perma.cc/FKN6-LMYN] (asserting that in June 2011, upstream
collection accounted for “only about 11% of the overall section 702 volume”); Letter from
Kathleen Turner, Dir. of Legislative Affairs, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, and
Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, to Mike
Rogers, Chairman, and C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Ranking Member, Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, House of Representatives 4 (May 4, 2012) http://
www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20
Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FKN6-LMYN]
(same); PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 33-34.
76.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 8.

77.

Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5.

78.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(4) (2012) (prohibiting the intentional acquisition of “any
communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of
the acquisition to be located in the United States”); PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD,
supra note 66, at 37-38.

79.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 37.
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NSA operate with one hundred percent accuracy, the prohibition on the
acquisition of domestic communications is still quite narrow. It is limited to
those communications in which the sender and all recipients are located in the
United States at the time of the communication. It would not include an e-mail
update sent to thirty friends and family members, so long as one of the thirty
recipients was outside the United States at the time he or she received the
communication.
Second, such collection does not just yield information that is “to” or
“from” a tasked selector. Rather, the entire transaction (not just the to/from
line) is screened to determine whether it contains the approved selector. This
yields communications that are “about” a selector—i.e., communications in
which the target is referenced, but is neither the sender nor the recipient of the
communications.80 Thus, even though section 702 collection is directed at nonU.S. persons located outside the United States, the NSA can collect a U.S.person-to-U.S.-person communication as long as the communication is
“about” (or mentions) the tasked selector.
Third, as of 2011, approximately ten percent of the twenty-six million five
hundred thousand Internet transactions acquired annually via upstream
collection involved the acquisition of what are known as “multiple
communication transactions.” These are multiple discrete communications
packaged together for the purpose of transiting the fiber-optic lines.81 As long
as one of the discrete communications included in the transaction contains
information “to,” “from,” or “about” the tasked selector, the NSA acquires the
entire multi-communication transaction, including other discrete
communications that may not contain the selector.82 According to one analysis,
the acquisition of multiple communication transactions resulted in the
collection of tens of thousands of communications each year that were not “to,”
“from,” or “about” the tasked selector.83 Acquisition of multi-communication
transactions also resulted in the collection of tens of thousands of wholly

80.

Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5; PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra
note 66, at 37-38.

81.

Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *11 n.32, *26.

82.

PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at 7.

83.

See Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *14 (“By acquiring such MCTs [multicommunication transactions], NSA likely acquires tens of thousands of additional
communications of non-targets each year, many of whom have no relationship whatsoever
with the user of the tasked selector.”); PRIVACY & C.L. OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 66, at
40; cf. Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *10 (emphasizing that, given
technological change, “it is impossible to define with any specificity the universe of
transactions that will be acquired by NSA’s upstream collection at any point in the future”).
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domestic communications.84 As Judge Bates, then-Chief Judge of the FISC,
wrote in 2011, the “NSA’s acquisition of [multiple communication
transactions] substantially broadens the circumstances in which Fourth
Amendment-protected interests are intruded upon by NSA’s Section 702
collection.”85
The executive branch also engages in a range of extraterritorial surveillance
activities not regulated by FISA, but instead governed by Executive Order
12,333. Reports suggest that electronic surveillance pursuant to Executive Order
12,333 accounts for an even greater share of electronic surveillance activities
than any equivalent surveillance conducted under FISA or FAA.86
Executive Order 12,333 prohibits the warrantless targeting of U.S. persons’
communications in situations where a warrant would have been required had
law enforcement agents in the United States been conducting the search.87 Yet
reports indicate that large quantities of U.S. persons’ information are being
obtained pursuant to surveillance governed by Executive Order 12,333.88 Of
note, such collection reportedly includes “vacuum cleaner” or “bulk” collection,
pursuant to which the Executive sweeps in all communications that transit a
particular cable without using a selector or other search term to limit the scope
of the acquired data.89 Reports suggest that bulk collection has included,
among other things, Internet metadata,90 webcam chats,91 cellphone location
84.

See Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *11 & n.32 (describing an estimated two
thousand to ten thousand multiple communication transactions that include at least one
wholly domestic communication, plus an estimated forty-six thousand single
communication transactions that were not screened out as wholly domestic—for example,
when a U.S.-based person uses a foreign server, making it appear as if the communication
included at least one non-U.S.-based user).

85.

Id. at *25; see id. at *26 (emphasizing that the tens of thousands of nontarget, protected
communications collected annually is a “very large number”).

86.

See, e.g., John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule that Lets the
NSA Spy on Americans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans
/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
[http://perma.cc/6DHP
-TNES]; Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Order 12333 and the Golden Number, JUST SECURITY (Oct.
9, 2014, 10:14 AM), http://justsecurity.org/16157/executive-order-12333-golden-number
[http://perma.cc/Q8ZH-NM6G].

87.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2012); see also Gannon, supra note 60, at 89.

88.

See Tye, supra note 86.

89.

See PPD-28, supra note 19, § 2 (referencing signals intelligence collected in “bulk” and
defining “bulk” collection to mean “the authorized collection of large quantities of signals
intelligence data which, due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without
the use of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.)” for specified
purposes).

90.

See Tye, supra note 86.
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data,92 and e-mail address books.93 Such bulk collection is not deemed to target
anyone, thus avoiding the prohibition on targeting U.S. persons. Other
collection programs fall outside the prohibition on targeting U.S. persons
based on a largely unreviewable executive branch determination that such
collection would not require a warrant if done for law enforcement purposes in
the United States.94
In short, while FISA putatively requires a warrant for the collection of U.S.
persons’ information, in practice such information can be collected without a
warrant in one of six situations: (1) if the NSA errs in its foreignness
determination and targets a U.S. person believing that person to be a non-U.S.
person; (2) when a U.S. person is in direct communication with a non-U.S.
person target; (3) when, as permitted in the context of so-called “upstream”
collection, the government targets communications “about” a non-U.S. person
target, and a U.S. person is party to those communications; (4) when, also
permitted as a part of upstream collection, the government collects a multicommunication transaction that includes discrete communications to or from
U.S. persons; (5) when the government, pursuant to Executive Order 12,333,
engages in “vacuum cleaner” collection and therefore is not technically
“targeting” any one person in particular; or (6) when collection occurs as a
result of extraterritorial surveillance activities that the executive branch
concludes would not trigger a warrant requirement if carried out in the United

91.

See Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images
Intercepted by GCHQ, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014
/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo [http://perma.cc/KN9D-76HM].

92.

See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents
-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_story.html [http://perma.cc/8TB2
-69CA]. Though the NSA denies that it is “intentionally collecting bulk cellphone location
information about cellphones in the United States,” such bulk collection of cellphone
location information outside the U.S. inevitably sweeps in millions of U.S. mobile phone
users who travel abroad every year. Id.

93.

See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books
Globally, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national
-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9
-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html [http://perma.cc/FS9J-2LKY].

94.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2) (2012) (“No element of the intelligence community may
intentionally target, for the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information, a United
States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States under
circumstances in which the targeted United States person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and a warrant would be required if the acquisition were conducted inside the United States for law
enforcement purposes [without a FISC-approved order or an Attorney General-issued
emergency exception] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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States by law enforcement, thus freeing the government from restrictions on
the targeting of U.S. persons. Categories two through five are all examples of
“incidental collection” and likely account for the vast majority of acquired U.S.
person information.
To sum up, the entire statutory scheme governing foreign intelligence
surveillance is premised on an assumption that persons located in the United
States are entitled to greater privacy protections than those outside U.S.
borders, and that U.S. persons are entitled to greater privacy protections than
non-U.S. persons. Yet, given the scope of incidental collection, the current
system provides only marginal protections for the U.S. persons it is designed
to protect.
In response to these concerns, the intelligence community points to
minimization rules that limit the retention, dissemination, and access to
collected U.S. persons’ data.95 Minimization rules, if sufficiently robust, can
provide important privacy protections. But it is worth noting that Congress to
date has given only scant attention to minimization rules and other use
restrictions. While Congress has mandated the implementation of
minimization procedures, it has delegated all of the key details to the executive
branch.96 Meanwhile, it has made acquisition of data its central focus,
legislating extensively on both the substantive standards and the procedural
requirements governing data collection. Congress thus appears to be operating
under the assumption that the collection itself constitutes a privacy intrusion—
and thus a potential harm—that needs to be regulated.97 To the extent that

95.

See, e.g., id. § 1801(h) (defining minimization procedures); id. § 1802(a)(2) (requiring
compliance with the minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General);
Safeguarding the Personal Information of All People: A Status Report on the Development and
Implementation of Procedures Under Presidential Policy Directive, OFF. DIRECTOR
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE 28 (July 2014), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1017/PPD
-28_Status_Report_Oct_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/J69Q-6MKA] (emphasizing the
importance of limitations on the use, dissemination, and retention of collected data); see also
David Cole & Marty Lederman, Data-Mining, Section 215, and Regulating the Government’s
Use of Stored Data: The Overlooked, but More Important, Question About NSA Surveillance,
JUST SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://justsecurity.org/4932/review-group
-intelligence-communications-technologies-bulk-data-collection-section-215 [http://perma
.cc/L5F3-CHNQ] (emphasizing the often overlooked importance of the “use” question).

96.

See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (delegating to the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, the responsibility to adopt the specific minimization
procedures that meet the overarching statutory requirements).

97.

There is a rich and thick literature articulating the privacy harm that flows from collection. I
do not purport to identify the primary concerns for Congress (which I suspect are multiple
and varied) or rank the relevant theories of harm. Rather, I just note the variety of possible
harms, ranging from the impact on personal autonomy and dignity to more consequentialist
harms about how the information might be used in the future to chill speech or to shift the
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Congress, the public, and the courts remain concerned about limiting the
government’s acquisition of U.S. persons’ data, the current set of territorial
and identity-based distinctions fail to serve these goals. I return to this issue in
Part III.
C. Territorial Warrant Authority
The warrant authority’s territorial-based limits implicate a very different
set of considerations than those underlying the Fourth Amendment and rules
on foreign intelligence. Whereas the limitations on the Fourth Amendment’s
reach reflect the government’s assessment of who is entitled to privacy
protections vis-à-vis the U.S. government, the limits on the warrant
requirement stem largely from respect for state sovereignty and an array of
pragmatic and related policy concerns. The overarching rule is that the
judiciary’s warrant authority is territorially limited.98 After all, under wellaccepted principles of international law, State A can exercise law enforcement
actions in State B only if State B consents.99 As a result, judges are presumed to
lack authority to unilaterally authorize extraterritorial searches and seizures.100

balance of power between the government and the governed. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426
(2000) (warning that “[t]he condition of no-privacy threatens not only to chill the
expression of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, to dampen the force of our
aspirations to it”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 487-88
(2006) (describing privacy as, among other things, protecting against “architectural”
harms—information gathering that creates a risk of future harm or that shifts the balance of
power between the government and the governed and results in a chilling effect); see also
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 8-9, 14-77 (2008) (cataloguing the varied
conceptions and limitations of privacy in a variety of contexts).
98.

See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2, II.A.3.

99.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES §
432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“A state’s law enforcement officers may exercise their
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by
duly authorized officials of that state.”); JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 478-79 (8th ed. 2012); Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The
Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 345, 372 (2009) (“The exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction in the territory of another state, without its consent, breaches the
non-intervention principle. . . . [E]xtraterritorial enforcement measures will nearly always
be considered illegal.”).

100.

See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting that “in Verdugo-Urquidez, seven justices of the Supreme Court endorsed the
view that U.S. courts are not empowered to issue warrants for foreign searches”); United
States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1092 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[F]oreign searches have neither
been historically subject to the warrant procedure, nor could they be as a practical matter.”).
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The following describes these territorial limits as applied to “ordinary”
warrants issued pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule
41),101 warrants issued under the Wiretap Act, which authorizes real-time
collection of electronic communications,102 and warrants issued under the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), which authorizes collection of stored
communications.103 While the territorial presumption is clear, its application to
the collection of data is not. Is the appropriate reference point the location of
the data, the provider, or the government agent accessing the data? As
described below, the answer is unclear, and the government has suggested
different answers depending on the context and its preferred outcome.
1. Rule 41
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the authority
of magistrate judges to issue a warrant for a search or seizure.104 This authority
is generally limited to property or persons within the district in which the
magistrate works. Even in those limited situations (such as terrorism cases) in
which judges are permitted to issue warrants authorizing out-of-district
searches or seizures, such warrants are still widely understood to be subject to
territorial-based limitations.105 In fact, the only instances in which magistrate
judges are explicitly authorized to issue a warrant with extraterritorial reach are
limited to situations in which: (1) the property or person to be searched or
seized is located in a U.S. territory, possession, or commonwealth; (2) the
object of the search is on the premises of a U.S. consular or diplomatic mission;
or (3) the object of a search is on a residence or land owned or leased by the
United States and used by U.S. diplomats or consular officers.106 All three
exceptions extend to locations where the United States already exerts
significant (if not exclusive) regulatory authority, thereby avoiding potential
conflicts with foreign jurisdictions and maintaining respect for other nations’
sovereign authority to enforce the law. Notably, the Supreme Court in 1990

101.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.

102.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012).

103.

Id. §§ 2701-2712.

104.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.

105.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (listing the sole instances in which out-of-district search warrants are
permitted); see also United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“[T]here is presently no statutory basis for the issuance of a warrant to conduct searches
abroad.”).

106.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(5).
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considered and rejected a proposed amendment to the rule that would have
permitted judges to issue extraterritorial search warrants in certain instances.107
A recently proposed amendment to Rule 41 has again raised questions
about the territorial limits of the judiciary’s warrant authority.108 The
amendment—proposed by the DOJ—would authorize judges to issue remote
access search warrants for electronically stored data in situations where the
location of the device or stored data being investigated is unknown.109 Notably,
DOJ had previously argued that magistrate judges already had jurisdiction to
issue such warrants under the existing version of Rule 41, on the grounds that
the agents accessing the data would be within the magistrate’s district. But at
least one magistrate judge rejected the government’s request.110 In his words,
the government’s position would effectively “permit FBI agents to roam the
world in search of a container of contraband, so long as the container is not
opened until the agents haul it off to the issuing district.”111 The magistrate
thus defined the relevant locus of the search and seizure as that of the computer
or data being gathered, rather than the location of the agents accessing the
device. Since the location of the computer was unknown, the magistrate lacked
jurisdiction to issue the warrant.112
107.

See Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 129 F.R.D. 557, 558 (1990) (“The
Court is of the view that the [proposed amendment to Rule 41 allowing for the issuance of
search warrants with extraterritorial effect] requires further consideration.”); id. at 573, 577
(describing and providing the text of the proposed amendment).

108.

See Proposed Amendment to Rule 41, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIM. RULES
165, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Criminal
/CR2014-04.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZQ5-NC6H]. The public’s comments on the proposal
were due on February 17, 2015. The amendment will become effective on December 1, 2016,
if approved by the relevant authorities (the Advisory Committee, the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court) and if Congress
does not act to defer, modify, or reject it.

109.

Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasizing that the
circumstances “where investigators can identify the target computer, but not the district in
which it is located[, are] occurring with greater frequency in recent years”); see also Timberg
& Nakashima, supra note 9 (describing the use of remote search tools in a terrorism case).

110.

See In re Warrant To Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
761 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

111.

Id. at 757. This argument has obvious parallels to the Supreme Court’s concern in Riley v.
California, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search of a cell phone
incident to arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). As the Court
put it, this would be akin to “finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed
law enforcement to unlock and search a house.” Id. at 2491.

112.

See In re Warrant To Search a Target Comput., 958 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (“Since the current
location of the Target Computer is unknown, it necessarily follows that the current location
of the information on the Target Computer is also unknown. This means that the
Government’s application cannot satisfy the territorial limits of Rule 41(b)(1).”).
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DOJ responded to the magistrate judge’s ruling with its proposed rule
revision—arguing that the authority is needed to address situations in which
anonymization tools disguise the location of a computer or other device being
used for criminal activity.113 But while the proposed rule responds to the
problem of anonymization, it raises the prospect of judges authorizing what
could turn out to be extraterritorial searches. After all, if the location of the
target device and/or data is unknown, agents and reviewing judges will not
know whether the sought-after data is located territorially or extraterritorially.
In fact, data on Tor (one of the largest anonymity networks)114 indicates that
more than eighty percent of its users connect to the network from outside the
United States.115 This statistic suggests a likelihood that DOJ would be
conducting extraterritorial searches in precisely the situations that are
motivating the proposed amendment—situations in which the device location
has been concealed through the use of anonymization tools. Moreover, even
when a targeted device is located territorially, the data accessed from the device
may be stored extraterritorially.
In a letter to the Rules Committee, Mythili Raman, the Criminal Division’s
Acting Assistant Attorney General, responded to the possibility of such
extraterritorial searching: “[S]hould the media searched prove to be outside
the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect, but the
existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the search.”116 In
other words, DOJ concedes that warrants issued under its proposed rule
change would not have extraterritorial reach; after all, U.S. judges have no
statutory authority to issue warrants with extraterritorial effect. But this raises
113.

See Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 9, at 2.

114.

Tor describes itself as a “free software and an open network that helps you defend against
traffic analysis, a form of network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy,
confidential business activities and relationships, and state security.” Tor Project:
Anonymity Online, TOR, http://www.torproject.org [http://perma.cc/WC5T-GUSY].
Anonymity networks operate by allowing users to access the Internet while hiding their
identity by, for example, hiding the identity of the device being used to access the Internet
and thereby concealing sites accessed. See Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tor and the Rise of
Anonymity Networks, DAILY DOT (Oct. 24, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.dailydot.com
/technology/tor-freenet-i2p-anonymous-network [http://perma.cc/XYG9-KSB9].

115.

See TOR Metrics—Top-10 Countries by Directly Connecting Users, TOR, http://metrics
.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html [http://perma.cc/4UQX-SME5] (estimating that
only about nineteen percent of Tor’s daily users are based in the United States); see also
Ahmed Ghappour, Justice Department Proposal Would Massively Expand FBI Extraterritorial
Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2014, 9:10 AM), http://justsecurity.org/15018/justice
-department-proposal-massive-expand-fbi-extraterritorial-surveillance
[http://perma.cc
/ET34-PD3C] (raising concerns about the ways in which this amendment will lead to
extraterritorial searches and seizures).

116.

Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 9, at 5.
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a series of significant yet unanswered questions about what agents will be
instructed to do if and when they discover that they are engaged in an
extraterritorial search. For example, will agents be obliged to cease the
investigation while they seek the consent of the nation where the computer or
data is located? Or can they continue their activities as they await the foreign
nation’s response? In fact, at least one magistrate judge has warned that he
might not be able to issue a warrant even with the rule change, given the risk
that he might be issuing an extraterritorial warrant.117
The government’s position with respect to this proposed rule revision is
notable for at least two additional reasons. First, DOJ appears to accept,
contrary to its position at least on earlier search warrant applications,118 that the
relevant search or seizure occurs where the data is located, and not where the
government accesses it. After all, as Raman’s letter explicitly asserts, “In light
of the presumption against international extraterritorial application . . . this
amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that
authorize the search of electronic storage media located in a foreign country or
countries.”119 Here, the government is assessing territoriality based on the
location of the data, not of the agents accessing the data, who presumably
remain in the United States.
Second, the proposed amendment covers not just devices held in unknown
locations, but also stored data held in unknown locations. Such a warrant
could, for example, be used to remotely access a computer and then that
computer could be used to access data stored in the cloud. This could include
data stored in whole, or in part, in Dublin, Ireland, or any of the many other
data storage centers located extraterritorially.120 Yet, according to the
government’s submission, if the government knows the data is being held in
Ireland (as it does in the Microsoft case), the magistrate could not issue the
warrant. The government’s position with respect to the proposed amendment
is thus in tension with its stance in the Microsoft case. In the Microsoft case, the
government is arguing that the location of the data is irrelevant when it

117.

Interview with Stephen Wm. Smith, U.S. Magistrate Judge, S. Dist. of Tex. (June 5, 2015).

118.

See In re Warrant To Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
756 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“Under the Government’s theory, because its agents need not leave
the district to obtain and view the information gathered from the Target Computer, the
information effectively becomes ‘property located within the district.’”).

119.

Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 9, at 4.

120.

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (noting that a cell phone can be “used to
access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen”); Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud
Computing?, PC MAG. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372163,00
.asp [http://perma.cc/H474-MZWJ] (explaining that with cloud computing, one stores and
accesses data over the Internet, rather than on one’s own hard drive).
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compels a third party to produce the requested data.121 But here, DOJ concedes
that the location of the data matters if it is the government doing the searching
or seizing.
2. Wiretap Authority
The Wiretap Act, first codified in 1968, covers real-time interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications.122 Every court to consider the issue
has concluded that the Wiretap Act only governs interceptions that occur
within the territory of the United States—a conclusion that is supported by the
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes, the legislative
history of the Act, and the territorial limits on magistrate judges’ warrant
jurisdiction found in Rule 41.123 However, all of these cases deal with instances
in which both the agents accessing the data and the data being accessed were
outside the United States.124 The courts have not yet, as far as I know,
addressed a situation in which an interception order is issued for a device that

121.

See infra Section II.C.

122.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2012). Among other criteria, the reviewing judge must make
probable cause findings with respect to the targeted individual, targeted communications,
and the facilities or places from which the communications are to be intercepted. Id. §
2518(3). Interception is subject to minimization requirements—requiring agents to take
steps to avoid the acquisition of nonrelevant content—and strict limits on use and disclosure
to others. Id. §§ 2517, 2518(5); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) (“Few
threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping
devices.”).

123.

See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the argument
that the wiretapping of telephones in Thailand could violate the Wiretap Act); Stowe v.
Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the Wiretap Act did not apply to an
extraterritorial interception in Canada); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279-80
(2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he statute significantly makes no provision for obtaining authorizations
for a wiretap in a foreign country.”); United States v. Angulo-Hurtado, 165 F. Supp. 2d
1363, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (concluding that the Wiretap Act does not have an
extraterritorial effect); see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 12 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566 (emphasizing that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), which amended the Wiretap Act, “regulates only those interceptions conducted
within the territorial United States”).

124.

In United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit considered
and rejected the argument that there was a sufficient territorial nexus to trigger the
application of the Wiretap Act simply because the intercepted telephone conversations had
traveled over the nation’s communication system. See also Stowe, 588 F.2d at 341 n.12 (“That
[the defendant] was in the United States when his calls were intercepted does not change
the result here. The law of the locality in which the tap exists (and where the interception
takes place) governs its validity, even though the intercepted phone conversations traveled
in part over the United States communication system.” (citing Cotroni, 527 F.2d at 711)).
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is located or travels outside the United States, but is being tapped by agents
located within the United States.
An analogous issue has arisen, however, with respect to wiretap orders for
interceptions that take place within the United States. In contrast to Rule 41
cases, which seem to assume that the location of property is what controls,
several Wiretap Act cases have suggested that territoriality should be assessed
based on either the location of the agent accessing the data or the location of
the data. In interpreting the jurisdictional provision of the Act—which permits
judges to authorize the “interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the
judge is sitting”125—numerous district and circuit courts have looked to both
the locus of the device being tracked and the locus of the agents as a basis for
establishing jurisdiction.126 In other words, so long as either the agents listening
in on the conversations or the device or wires being tapped are within the
judge’s district, then the jurisdiction requirement (territoriality) is satisfied.
But the issue is not settled. At least one circuit court has disagreed,
concluding that the physical listening device must be installed within the
authorizing court’s district, even if a device installed elsewhere will be
monitored by agents operating within the district.127 Thus, at least in the
District of Columbia Circuit, the location of the property being tracked—not
the location of the agents—controls.128 Moreover, all the cases involve
situations in which both the agents and the device being monitored are located
within the United States, leaving unresolved the rule that applies if the agent is
located territorially but the device being monitored is located outside the
United States.
3. The Stored Communications Act
A separate statutory scheme—the SCA—governs the collection of stored
data, such as e-mails housed on a server or documents stored in the cloud.
125.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2012).

126.

See, e.g., United States v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The most reasonable
interpretation of the statutory definition of interception is that an interception occurs where
the tapped phone is located and where law enforcement officers first overhear the call.”);
United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849, 852-53 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Denman,
100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir.
1992).

127.

See United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 514-15 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding a warrant invalid
because the mobile interception device was installed on property located outside the
authorizing judge’s jurisdiction).

128.

See id.
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Passed in 1986 as part of the ECPA, the SCA criminalizes unauthorized access
to, and disclosure of, stored communications. It lays out the procedures and
standards by which law enforcement agents can lawfully compel disclosure
from an ISP. It is also the statute at issue in the Microsoft case.129 It specifies
different forms of compulsory processes—subpoena, court order, and
warrant—that vary in terms of what they require and when they apply.130
By the terms of the statute, a subpoena can be used to obtain a range of
noncontent information from service providers, including their customers’
names, addresses, payment information, and records of session times and
duration.131 When proceeding by subpoena, the government must either notify
the customer, thus providing an opportunity to object, or obtain a delayed
notification order.132 Delayed notification is permitted based on a courtapproved “adverse result” finding, defined to include, among other things,
destruction or tampering with evidence, flight from prosecution,
endangerment of individuals, or undue trial delay.133
A court order is required to obtain more detailed records about a
customer’s activities, such as historical logs detailing the e-mail addresses with
which the customer has communicated, records of what IP addresses the user
visited over time, and buddy lists.134 A magistrate judge issues a court order
based on a finding of “specific and articulable facts” that the information
sought is “relevant” to an ongoing criminal investigation.135
Finally, in order to compel an electronic service provider to disclose the
content of communications (i.e., e-mails) stored for 180 days or less, the
government must obtain a warrant based upon a finding of probable cause.136
Several courts have concluded that, as a matter of constitutional law, the
warrant requirement also applies to the acquisition of all e-mails, including
129.

For a thorough analysis of the Stored Communications Act, see Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1208 (2004). See also Kerr, The Next Generation, supra note 10.

130.

18 U.S.C. § 2703.

131.

Id. § 2703(c)(2).

132.

Id. §§ 2703(b), 2705 (describing delayed notification standards and procedures).

133.

Id. § 2705(2).

134.

Id. §§ 2703(c)(1)(E), 2703(c)(2).

135.

Id. § 2703(d) (detailing the requirements of a court order).

136.

Id. § 2703(a). At the time the SCA was passed, the category of e-mails stored for 180 days or
less was understood as covering the vast majority of stored e-mails; limited storage capacity
meant that only a small fraction of e-mails would be stored past 180 days. This is no longer
the case. See Kerr, The Next Generation, supra note 10. For a critique of the Stored
Communications Act as insufficiently protective of privacy interests, see David J. Solove,
Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1298 (2004).
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those stored for more than 180 days, as well as e-mails held by remote storage
providers, which are not covered by the statutory warrant requirement.137
The legislative history, coupled with the presumption against
extraterritoriality, overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the SCA does
not apply extraterritorially. The 1986 House Judiciary Committee Report on
the SCA states that the provisions “regarding access to stored wire and
electronic communications are intended to apply only to access in the territorial
United States.”138 When Congress amended the statute in 2001 to authorize
magistrates to issue multidistrict warrants, the amendment was entitled
“Nationwide Service of Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence.”139
Unsurprisingly, the one case (other than the Microsoft case) to present the
question of the SCA’s geographic reach concluded that it was territorially
limited. In Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc., a district court judge rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that the SCA applied to the conduct of Yahoo! China.140 The case,
however, was relatively straightforward: the data was located in China; the
137.

See Kerr, The Next Generation, supra note 10, at 383 (describing the evolution of different
rules for so-called “electronic communications service” providers and “remote computing
service” providers). Only stored e-mails of electronic service providers are protected by a
warrant requirement under the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); e-mails and other content
held by remote service providers can be disclosed pursuant to a court order or even an
administrative subpoena, see id. § 2703(b). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to
obtain . . . emails warrantlessly, [that portion of] the SCA is unconstitutional.”); In re
Applications for Search Warrants for Case Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW & Info. Associated with
12-MJ-8191-DJW Target Email Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012
WL 4383917, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (“The Court finds the rationale set forth in
Warshak persuasive and therefore holds that an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in emails or faxes stored with, sent to, or received thorough an electronic
communications service provider.”); United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39 n.39
(D.D.C. 2012) (citing Warshak for the proposition that “individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of emails stored, sent, or received through a
commercial internet service provider”); see also Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 107577 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the government’s argument that a warrant is not required to
access a backup copy of a customer’s opened e-mail that is held on the provider’s server).
That said, the government continues to argue in the Microsoft case that Warshak got it
wrong, that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to e-mail held by a third-party provider,
and that, in any event, there is no search or seizure until the e-mails are actually opened and
reviewed by government agents. See Oral Argument Transcript, Dist. Ct., Microsoft, supra
note 1, at 4.

138.

H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 32-33 (1986).

139.

Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 220, 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 272, 291-92 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703, 2711); H.R. REP. NO.
107-236, at 57 (2001).

140.

Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C-08-1068, 2009 WL 4430297, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009).
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Yahoo! China employees who accessed the data were in China; and the
disclosures took place in China.141 The key question, therefore, was whether
Yahoo!’s United States headquarters exercised sufficient control over Yahoo!
China to bring its actions within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
district court concluded that it did not.
As with the Wiretap Act, it is clear that a territorial presumption applies to
the SCA. But the question of how this presumption applies when an
international border separates the data and the person or entity accessing the
data remains unsettled. What is the relevant location for determining
territoriality—that of the ISP accessing the data or that of the data itself? In the
Microsoft case, the government is arguing that it is the location of the ISP that
controls. In making this claim, the government makes two analytical moves.
First, the government emphasizes the language of compulsory process. The
SCA authorizes the use of a warrant to “require . . . disclosure”—employing
language of required disclosure that generally applies to subpoena power.
According to the government, the subpoena power thus provides the
appropriate frame of reference.142 Second, the government draws on rules
governing subpoenas, which require the recipient of the subpoena to turn over
information within its control, irrespective of its location. What matters then,
according to the government, is the location of the ISP (the recipient of the
warrant)—not the location of the data.143
But, as Microsoft and several amici have noted, there are two flaws with
this argument. First, Congress used the term “warrant” in the SCA, not
“subpoena”; there is thus good reason to think that the rules governing
warrants—not subpoenas—control.144 Second, even if the analogy to
subpoenas is the correct one, subpoenas generally have been relied upon to
compel disclosure of a company’s own records; they have not traditionally been
relied upon to compel disclosure of a customer’s private data that has been
141.

Id. at *1, *4.

142.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012); Brief for Appellee, Microsoft, supra note 1, at 17-18.

143.

Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 9 (“Under long settled precedent, the power of compelled
disclosure reaches records stored abroad so long as there is personal jurisdiction over the
custodian and the custodian has control over the records.”); see also id. at 26-30.

144.

See Brief for Appellant at 16, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled
& Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 8. 2014) (“There is no basis
in the statute’s text for the district court’s conclusion that Congress actually meant to create
a new ‘hybrid’ subpoena when it said warrant.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Amazon.com, Inc.
and Accenture PLC in Support of Appellant at 5-8, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15,
2014) [hereinafter Amazon Amici] (emphasizing key differences between warrants and
subpoenas); Brief of Amici Curiae Media Organizations in Support of Appellant at 17-27, In
re Warrant, slip op.
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stored with the company.145 The government could not, for example, use a
subpoena to compel a post office to turn over mail it is transporting. Nor could
the government use a subpoena to compel a landlord to collect and turn over
the papers stored in a tenant’s home. This is for good reason. One ought to
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in property that is being entrusted
with a third party for the limited purposes of transmittal or storage.146
I return to these issues in Section III.C. For now, it is simply worth noting
that, while the SCA is rightly understood to be territorially limited, the
question of what is territorial and what is extraterritorial is in sharp dispute.
And neither the text nor the legislative history provides the necessary guidance.
The issue was not on the minds of the SCA’s drafters, who wrote at a time
when the Internet was still in its infancy and few communications crossed
international borders.147 And none of the subsequent amendments to the SCA
addressed the statute’s extraterritorial reach or the key question presented in
the Microsoft case—whether directing a U.S.-based service provider to disclose
data located outside the United States is a territorial or extraterritorial action.
***
To recap, territoriality is a critical factor in assessing both the reach of the
Fourth Amendment and the scope of the government’s authority to search and
seize. In fact, it is often determinative of the rules that apply. However,
territoriality serves different underlying purposes in the different constitutional
and statutory contexts in which it operates. Territoriality in the context of the
Fourth Amendment serves as a proxy for the notion that only “the people”—a
145.

See Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 16-17 (“[A] bank can be compelled to produce the
transaction records from a foreign branch, but not the contents of a customer’s safe deposit
box kept there.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
et al. in Support of Appellant at 17-18, In re Warrant, slip op. [hereinafter Brennan Center et
al. Amici] (arguing that while subpoenas my be sufficient to obtain business records, they
are not sufficient for obtaining a customer’s e-mails); Brief of Verizon Communications Inc.
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20, In re Warrant, slip op. (emphasizing
that “the Bank of Nova Scotia doctrine has never been extended beyond a company’s own
business records to reach information belonging to a company’s customers”). But see Oral
Argument Transcript, 2d Cir., Microsoft, supra note 2, at 47-49 (rejecting the proposition
that the subpoena authority is limited to the acquisition of a corporation’s business records
and citing cases); Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 37-39 (same).

146.

See Kiel Robert Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (laying out the normative justification for such a rule); infra note 188
and accompanying text.

147.

See Kerr, The Next Generation, supra note 10, at 405 (“[I]ssues regarding the territorial scope
of the statute did not arise in early debates over ECPA. Congress was instead focused on the
rights of U.S. computer users and U.S. services.”).
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category that excludes most non-U.S. persons located abroad—are entitled to
the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The Fourth Amendment thus binds the
government when it searches or seizes property within the United States, but
poses no constraint when the government is searching or seizing the property
of an alien who lacks substantial connections to the nation and is located
outside the United States.
The nation’s foreign intelligence surveillance scheme adopts this basic
approach as well. Targeting of U.S. persons and persons located within the
United States is subject to heightened procedural and substantive protections
as compared with non-U.S. persons located outside the U.S. boundaries.
Similarly, collection of data physically located in the United States is subject to
heightened regulation and oversight as compared to collection of data located
outside the United States. As with the Fourth Amendment, the underlying
assumption is that U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents deserve
enhanced privacy protections.
Territoriality in the context of warrant jurisdiction is equally important,
but serves a very different purpose. It stems from respect for other states’
sovereignty, as well as an appreciation for the political and diplomatic
consequences of failing to do so. The unilateral exercise of law enforcement in
another state’s territory is a breach of that state’s sovereignty, potentially
justifying countermeasures under international law.148 While there may be
times when law enforcement or national security interests override
international law considerations, this is generally a decision best made by the
political branches after a full analysis of the costs and benefits—not hundreds
of federal and state court judges scattered across the country.149 Territorial
limits on warrant jurisdiction reflect this basic understanding.
But, as the following Part highlights, data is beginning to challenge this
established understanding.
ii. d a t a is d if f e r e n t
Territorial-based distinctions—whatever their purpose—depend, at their
core, on the ability to distinguish between the relevant “here” and “there” and a
148.

See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures
Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 700-07 (defining
countermeasures and explaining their potential applicability in response to breaches of
sovereignty).

149.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2012) (authorizing federal magistrates, federal judges, and
state court judges to issue ECPA warrants pursuant to the requisite procedures); About Us,
FED. MAGISTRATE JUDGES ASS’N, http://www.fmja.org/about-us.html [http://perma.cc
/B6WR-RU98] (stating that there were 527 full-time magistrate judges in 2011).
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determination that the “here” and “there” matter. Data, and the manner in
which it is accessed and controlled, is undercutting both of these foundational
assumptions. This Part explores how data differs from its tangible counterparts
and why these differences matter. It focuses in particular on data’s mobility,
divisibility, location independence, intermingling, and third-party control.
A. Data’s Mobility
Physical objects moving from place to place are constrained by the ordinary
laws of physics and by generally observable and conscious choices about how
to move from Point A to Point B. For example, a person traveling from
Washington, D.C., to Philadelphia will generally take the most direct route by
traversing across Maryland and Delaware. If the traveler detours to France, it is
likely the result of a planned decision. The same is true for data’s closest
tangible counterpart: mail. It is highly unlikely that the United States Postal
Service would send a letter through Paris on the way from Washington, D.C.
to Philadelphia absent some significant snafu. Similarly, when one stores
tangible property in a safe-deposit box or locked storage unit, it has a known,
observable, and fixed location. Absent a theft or seizure of property, it will stay
there until the owner decides to move it elsewhere.
Data’s mobility—in particular its speed and unpredictability—challenges
our understanding of both what it means to transit from place to place and
what it means to “store” our property. When two Americans located in the
United States send an e-mail, the underlying zeroes and ones generally transit
domestic cables. But they also, with some nonnegligible frequency, exit our
borders before returning to show up on the recipient’s computer screen.150
When one Google chats with a friend in Philadelphia or uses FaceTime with a
spouse on a business trip in California, the data may travel through France
without the parties knowing that this is the case. Similarly, when data is stored
in the cloud, it does not reside in a single fixed, observable location akin to a
safe-deposit box. It may be moved around for technical processing or server
maintenance reasons. It could also be copied or divided up into component
parts and stored in multiple places—some territorially and some
extraterritorially.151 At any given moment, the user may have no idea—and no
150.

See, e.g., Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central
Intelligence Agency).

151.

See, e.g., Oral Argument Transcript, Dist. Ct., Microsoft, supra note 1, at 20 (“Data can be
stored at any place, at any time . . . . [T]oday with cloud services, it has become increasingly
common for the location of data to change from day to day, or hour to hour. You can have
the contents of a single account distributed across multiple servers.”); see also John M.
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ability to know—where his or her data is being stored or moved, or the path by
which it is transiting.
These distinctions between tangible property and data matter for at least
two reasons. First, they highlight the potential arbitrariness of data location as
determinative of the rules that apply. Whereas the location of one’s own person
and tangible property is subject to generally understood rules and limitations
on the way physical property moves through space, data can move from Point
A to Point B in circuitous and arbitrary ways, all at breakneck speed. This is
precisely the government’s point in the Microsoft case when it warns against the
“arbitrary outcomes” that would result if government access to data depended
on where a provider chose to hold data at any given point in time.152 And while
the government fails to make the point, the same argument can be made with
respect to privacy protections that turn on data location.
Second, the path that data travels is often determined without the
knowledge, choice, or even input of the data user.153 This matters for purposes
of both notice and consent. It is widely understood that when one travels to, or
retains property in, a foreign jurisdiction, one is subject to that sovereign
nation’s laws. Individuals and entities are required to conform their behavior
accordingly or accept the consequences. But if an individual sends an e-mail to

Cauthen, Executing Search Warrants in the Cloud, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://leb.fbi.gov/2014/october/executing-search-warrants-in-the-cloud [http://perma.cc
/K2N5-U5MF] (“[I]n a cloud-computing environment . . . little, if any, data pertaining to a
computer user is found in a single geographic location.”); Data Centers, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/data-security/index.html [http://perma
.cc/6Z2V-KKQR] (detailing Google’s data storage across multiple servers in various
locations). But see Brief for Amici Curiae Computer and Data Science Experts in Support of
Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 21, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-Mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief for Computer and Data Science Experts] (“[I]mpracticalities
of . . . partitioning very small segments of data across geographically dispersed data centers
mean that a given individual’s email will generally be isolated to a particular region, if not a
particular datacenter and server, regardless of the vendor.”).
152.

Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 53. Microsoft counters that the location decisions are
hardly arbitrary, but instead they are designed to keep data physically near the user to the
maximum extent possible so as to minimize network latency (i.e., the delay between the
time the data is requested and the time it is delivered). See In re Warrant To Search a
Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466,
467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[B]ecause the quality of service decreases the farther a user is from
the datacenter where his account is hosted, efforts are made to assign each account to the
closest datacenter.” (citing Microsoft affidavits)); see also Brief for Computer and Data
Science Experts, supra note 151, at 20 (noting that Google seeks to keep data near its Gmail
users).

153.

See, e.g., Cauthen, supra note 151 (“The problem is that finding where . . . data is physically
stored can be very difficult—even the user might not know where it is.”).
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a friend in Philadelphia that happens to transit through another nation, that
individual is not consciously choosing to bind himself to any particular foreign
government’s laws. Nor is the user consciously choosing to relinquish
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment or statutory protections
governing the search and seizure of property in the United States simply
because the data happens to transit outside the United States. Similarly, when
one stores data in the cloud, one often has little control or even knowledge
about the places where it is being held; these are decisions that are instead
generally entrusted to computer algorithms. The user thus lacks knowledge
and choice as to the rules that apply.154
B. Data’s Divisibility and Data Partitioning
Data stored in the cloud is often copied and held in more than one location.
This protects against server malfunctions and ensures that a user can continue
to access his or her data from a back-up location. Some storage locations might
be territorial and some might be extraterritorial.155 This is akin to making
multiple copies of one’s documents and storing those copies in multiple
jurisdictions. This practice, therefore, is not unique to data. But the ease and
speed by which data can be copied and moved has led to an exponential
increase in multisite—and possibly multination—storage.
Data partitioning—under which a single database is divided into multiple
parts so as to increase the manageability and efficiency of use—adds another
layer of complexity.156 The various components of a partitioned database may
154.

This lack of knowledge or conscious choice can be addressed through the introduction of
terms of service agreements that specify the location of one’s data. A number of
governments are also considering legislation that would require certain data be stored
domestically. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677
(2015) (surveying localization laws).

155.

See Sasha Segall, Note, Jurisdictional Challenges in the United States Government’s Move to
Cloud Computing Technology, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1114-15
(2013) (detailing the numerous data servers operated by U.S. companies that are located
outside the United States); Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about
/datacenters/inside/locations [http://perma.cc/KNK8-Y6GR].

156.

See, e.g., Ian Walden, Accessing Data in the Cloud: The Long Arm of the Law Enforcement Agent
3 (Queen Mary Univ. of London, Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 74, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781067 [http://perma.cc/SA7K-J83V] (“Techniques widely used
in cloud computing, such as ‘sharding’ or ‘partitioning,’ mean that the data will likely be
stored as fragments across a range of machines, logically linked and reassembled on
demand, rather than as a contiguous data set.”); Tony Morales, Oracle Database VLDB and
Partitioning Guide, ORACLE 1-2 (July 2007), http://docs.oracle.com/cd/B28359_01/server.111
/b32024.pdf [http://perma.cc/488S-RZK8] (describing the benefits of partitioning). But see
Brief for Computer and Data Science Experts, supra note 151, at 20-21 (noting that, while
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be held in multiple locations. In certain instances, so-called “relational
databases” are only comprehensible if pulled up using the appropriate
application. A health care provider, for example, may be able to pull up a
patient’s medical records in his or her office. But the component pieces—the
patient’s name, biographical information, and drug history—might be
distributed and stored in different locations; without the appropriate software,
the relevant information could not be assembled in a usable form.157
Data divisibility and data partitioning thus highlight the potential
arbitrariness and complications of making data location determinative of the
rules that apply. Can the government evade Fourth Amendment protections
that apply to a non-U.S. person’s data stored within the United States by
instead searching or seizing a back-up copy stored extraterritorially? Can (or
more importantly, should) the United States demand that U.S.-based ISPs
retain copies of their customers’ data within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States so as to avoid the kinds of issues being raised by the Microsoft
case? In a relational database, is the relevant location the place from which the
data is accessed and reassembled in a usable form, or the locations where each
of the component parts is stored? Under the analogous rule for tangible
property, the location of each component part would control. But this would
require a territoriality determination—and possibly the application of different
rules—for the acquisition of the various fragments of a sought-after account or
database. As these questions suggest, data location is both highly manipulable
and, in some cases, difficult to define. The manipulability and indeterminacy of
data thus undercut the normative significance and stability of data location,
raising important questions as to the primacy of data location in determining
the rules that apply.
C. Location Independence
1. Disconnect Between Location of Access and Location of Data
One of the biggest changes wrought by modern technology is the possible
disconnect between the location of the government actor performing the search
or seizure and the location of the property being searched or seized. With the
rise of modern technology, an agent conducting a search or seizure no longer
need be physically located in the same place as the target of the search or

sharding and partitioning are useful for very large files, it would be highly inefficient to
shard or partition e-mail messages and then reconstitute them each time a user accesses his
or her account, given their small size).
157.

See Cauthen, supra note 151 (describing relational databases).

369

the yale law journal

125:326

2015

seizure.158 This Section begins by analyzing how courts and the executive
branch have addressed this location independence between government agents
and their targets in the context of guns and drones. It then explores how data’s
unique features affect the analysis.
In two recent cases, U.S. border control agents located on U.S. soil shot
and killed noncitizens on the Mexican side of the border.159 In both cases, the
parents of the deceased children brought (among other claims) Fourth
Amendment excessive force claims. In Hernandez v. United States, the Fifth
Circuit (sitting en banc) dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim on the basis
that the decedent was a noncitizen located outside the United States.160 In
contrast, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Arizona district court allowed the Fourth
Amendment claim to proceed given, among other things, the decedent’s
proximity to and familial connections with the United States.161 Notably, even
though the two courts split on the outcome, they adopted the same
territoriality analysis. Both courts concluded that the relevant seizure took
place in Mexico, where the decedents were killed, rather then the United
States, where the agents who fired the shots were located. In both cases,
territoriality rested on the location of the target, not the location of the agent.
Because the targets in both cases were located abroad, both cases were
presumed to involve extraterritorial seizures.162
The use of drones provides another example of the potential disconnect
between government agents and their targets. Drone operators sitting in
Langley, Virginia, or at any one of a number of military bases, can remotely
pilot a drone and drop a bomb halfway around the world in, say, Yemen,
Somalia, or Iraq. Yet virtually every legal and policy analysis of drone strikes
assumes, consistent with the border shooting cases, that territoriality is
determined by the location of the target. Thus, targeted killings constitute
extraterritorial actions (i.e., seizures), regardless of the location of the drone
operator.163
158.

See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (noting that, thanks to cloud
computing, the location of the data being searched and the location of the agent conducting
the search may not be one and the same).

159.

Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014) (involving a scenario in which
a border agent in Texas shot and killed a fifteen-year-old Mexican), rev’d en banc, rev’d per
curiam, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-118 (U.S. July 27, 2015);
Rodriguez v. Swartz, No. 4:14-CV-02251 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2015) (involving a scenario in
which a border agent in Arizona shot and killed a sixteen-year-old Mexican).

160.

Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 119; see also Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266-67.

161.

Rodriguez, slip op. at *12-16.

162.

See Hernandez, 785 F.3d at 119; Rodriguez, slip op. at *8.

163.

See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron to Eric Holder, supra note 7.
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By straightforward analogy to guns and drones, the initial search and
seizure of data would be understood to take place where the data was stored
and manipulated, rather than where it was accessed or reviewed. And that is
how courts and the government have generally considered the issue of search
and seizure of data on personal computers: they have focused on the location of
the computer where the data is stored, rather than the location of the
government actor. In United States v. Gorshkov,164 for example, agents located in
Seattle remotely accessed and copied data from a computer in Russia. The
district court deemed this an extraterritorial search because the computer was
located overseas at the time it was accessed—making the location of the data,
rather than the agents, the key determinant of territoriality.165 (Russia deemed
this an extraterritorial search as well, asserting that it was a violation of its
domestic law and filing criminal charges against one of the FBI agents
involved.166) As discussed in Section I.C.1, DOJ’s commentary on the proposed
Rule 41 amendment to permit the issuance of remote search warrants similarly
accepts that the territoriality analysis depends on where the data is located—
not on the location of the government agent remotely accessing or
manipulating the data.167
But, as the government’s position in the Microsoft case suggests, this
seemingly straightforward transposal of the rules applicable to drones and
guns to the world of data is contestable. There is, after all, a key difference
between shooting a gun or activating a remotely controlled drone and
manipulating data in the ways described in the Gorshkov or Microsoft cases.
When a government agent shoots a gun across the border or launches a drone
in Somalia, there is an apparent, tangible invasion of airspace and an apparent,
tangible effect in another nation’s territory (such as an explosion, the
destruction of property, or the possible killing of individuals). But when the
government or its agents in State A remotely access a server in State B and copy

164.

United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026 (W.D. Wash. May 23,
2001).

165.

Id. at *3 (holding that “agents’ extraterritorial access to computers in Russia and their
copying of data contained thereon” was not covered by the Fourth Amendment since it was
an extraterritorial action directed at a nonresident alien located outside the United States).

166.

Mike Brunker, FBI Agent Charged with Hacking, MSNBC (Aug. 15, 2002), http://www
.nbcnews.com/id/3078784/#.VM178lph3L9 [http://perma.cc/9H5T-KZRV].

167.

See supra Section I.C.1; see also Letter from Mythili Raman to Reena Raggi, supra note 9, at 4
(“In light of the presumption against international extraterritorial application, and
consistent with the existing language of Rule 41(b)(3), this amendment does not purport to
authorize courts to issue warrants that authorize the search of electronic storage media
located in a foreign country or countries.”).

371

the yale law journal

125:326

2015

data located there, there is often neither an observable effect in State B nor a
change in the data user’s ability to access and use the data.168
In fact, some have concluded that, because remote access of a server does
not alter or interfere with the user’s ability to access his or her data, the copying
of data does not amount to a constitutionally relevant seizure. Kerr, for
example, initially asserted that copying data is not a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes because it leaves the data owner’s possessory interests
intact.169 The magistrate judge in the Microsoft case agreed, and cited Kerr for
the proposition that the relevant constitutional moment first occurs when the
data is reviewed in the United States—not when it is merely copied.170
Kerr, however, later changed his perspective, concluding that the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures is designed to regulate,
among other things, the government’s ability to secure and control
information.171 When copying data adds to the pool of information available to
the government, it constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.172 Although this
claim is arguably in tension with Supreme Court precedent,173 several other

168.

But see, e.g., Walden, supra note 156, at 4 (noting that remote data retrieval may yield data
changes, particularly when accessed through certain types of cloud-based interfaces or
unknown architecture).

169.

Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 557-58 (2005).
Kerr nonetheless argues that the manipulation of a computer or other device that is required
to copy the data is itself a constitutionally cognizable search. Therefore, he would still
require a warrant, but on the basis of the manipulation of the machine, not the mere
copying of data. Id. at 558, 561.

170.

In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Fourth Amendment argument is a bit
of a red herring, as it is largely irrelevant to the central question about warrant jurisdiction
under the ECPA and the related questions of international comity. State A can still interfere
with State B’s sovereignty even if the action does not rise to the level of a search or seizure
under Fourth Amendment doctrine. An FBI agent who went through a suspect’s garbage in
Dublin, without the knowledge and consent of the Irish government, would almost
certainly be violating the prohibition on unilateral law enforcement activities in another
state’s territory, even though looking through garbage is not a search under current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (concluding that
collection of and rummaging through garbage is not a search).

171.

See Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700, 704 (2010)
(acknowledging a change in thinking and rejecting his earlier views about whether copying
constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).

172.

Id. at 709-14.

173.

See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (emphasizing that a seizure requires
an interference with an individual’s possessory interest in property). When data is merely
copied and not removed or otherwise altered, the target’s ability to use and manipulate the
data is unaffected. The claim, therefore, must turn on some alternative possessory interests,
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scholars and courts have similarly concluded that the copying of electronic data
constitutes a seizure.174
My point here is not to try to resolve this dispute. Rather, the mere fact
that this is an active debate is an example of the ways in which data is different.
Unlike an explosion from a gun or a missile, the extraterritorial copying of
zeroes and ones can be done surreptitiously and without any observable change
to conditions in State B. This opens up space for the government’s argument
that the location of access, not the location of data, is what counts.
2. Disconnect Between Data and the Data User
Location independence refers to the idea that data need not be stored in the
same location as, or anywhere near, its user. This allows users to access their
data from wherever they are located and is central to the efficiency of the cloud.
Among other benefits, location independence allows providers to move data in
order to minimize the use of storage centers at peak times, avoid down servers
or power outages, and perform server maintenance without disrupting user
access.175 Under current practices, providers control the location of data.
Providers generally make such location decisions without notifying the user or
obtaining his or her consent each time the data is moved from one place to
another. In fact, the user is often blissfully ignorant of where his or her data is
stored at any given moment.
As discussed above, this raises normative questions about making data
location determinative of the rules that apply. We generally assume that the
location of one’s tangible property is a product of choice, and that it indicates a
connection to the place in which the property is located. But with data, this
such as the possessory interest in excluding and determining who, and under what
circumstances, others are permitted to access one’s property.
174.

See, e.g., Brennan Center et al. Amici, supra note 145, at 4 (“The Fourth Amendment
‘moment’ occurs at the point the data is copied and produced to law enforcement, regardless
of when or whether an officer might look at it.”); Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A.
Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 39, 113 (2002) (“Copying has an effect upon the ‘ownership’ rights of the
party whose information is copied. For policy reasons, the copying of data should be defined
as a seizure.”); Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right To Delete, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 10, 12
(2005) (“The right to delete explains why imaging is seizure without requiring Hicks to be
overruled or otherwise conflicting with existing jurisprudence.”); cf. United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“It only stands to reason that, if government
agents compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber’s emails, those agents have
thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search.”).

175.

Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud,
73 MD. L. REV. 313, 325-28 (2013) (outlining the basic structure and efficiencies of cloud
computing).
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basic assumption linking the interests of the person to the location of his or her
property falls apart. When the user has no knowledge of where his or her data
is at any given moment, it is hard to claim that data location means much to
the user. This disconnect reinforces the point made earlier: that data location at
any given point in time is neither a good indicator of the data user’s ties to a
particular location nor a fair determinant (from the perspective of the user) of
the rules that ought to apply.
The location independence of data and its user also creates practical
problems for law enforcement officials seeking to abide by the law. First, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Riley v. California,176 even when law enforcement
agents locate a target’s smartphone, computer, or other electronic device, they
often will not know where the data stored on the device is physically being
held.177 This creates hurdles for law enforcement, for even when it has a device
and all the necessary passwords, it will not necessarily be able to ascertain—
thanks to the cloud—whether it is accessing data that is stored territorially or
extraterritorially.178 (This problem, of course, does not arise when the
government is, as in the Microsoft case, compelling the production of data
directly from a third-party provider that holds the data and can ascertain its
location.)
Second, location independence of data and the data user means that even
when law enforcement officers can determine the location of data, they may
not know anything about the location of the data user, let alone the degree of
his or her connections to the United States. Imagine, hypothetically, a law
enforcement agent trying to track down the location and identity of the author
of an e-mail describing plans to remotely detonate explosives at an upcoming
parade. The agent needs to connect the data to the device that sent the e-mail;
determine the location of the device; and then ascertain the location of the
device’s user, which, absent real-time tracking, may not be the same as that of
the device itself. Finally, the agent may need to determine the identity of the
user—that is, whether or not the user is a citizen or noncitizen with substantial
voluntary connections to the United States. While this identification might be
feasible (albeit difficult) when dealing with discrete targets for law
enforcement purposes, the sheer quantity of data collected under current
surveillance programs makes it impossible to perform such individualized
176.

134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that, absent exigent circumstances, police must obtain
a warrant before searching a cell phone incident to arrest).

177.

Id. at 2491 (“[O]fficers searching a phone’s data would not typically know whether the
information they are viewing was stored locally at the time of the arrest or has been pulled
from the cloud.”).

178.

See also supra Section I.C.1 (discussing this problem in the context of remote search
warrants).
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analysis.179 Instead, the intelligence communities rely on—as they must—
certain presumptions, such as the presumption that a target of unknown
location is a non-U.S. person.180 Even the best presumptions will inevitably be
over- or under-inclusive in some nonnegligible number of cases. Meanwhile,
the use of anonymization tools compounds these identification difficulties for
law enforcement and intelligence agents alike.
Such identification difficulties are not unique to data. After all, if FedEx
inspects a suspicious looking package, discovers cocaine, and turns that
information over to the government, law enforcement agents will need to track
down the sender of the package. Perhaps there is a clearly written return
address that takes them directly to the sender, but more likely, there is either
no return address, a false address, and/or an address that is accurate but at
which the sender is no longer located. Thus, identification problems arise even
with tangible evidence. But the quantity of electronic data, the rise of
anonymization tools, and the circuitous way in which data transits from place
to place magnify and exacerbate the difficulties associated with user
identification. These difficulties raise questions about the viability of schemes
that make user location and identity key components of the rules that apply.
D. Data’s Intermingling
Data is also different from tangible analogs in the way it can, and often
does, intermingle the property of multiple users. As discussed in Section I.B,
communications transiting the fiber-optic networks are often bundled together
as multi-communication transactions. The NSA currently lacks the
technological capacity to separate out these communications into their discrete
components.181 Thus, if any one of the multiple communications is “to,”
“from,” or “about” a non-U.S. person who is the target of surveillance, the
government will acquire the entire transaction. Discrete communications that
are part of the transaction, but not “to,” “from,” or “about” the target—
including transactions to or from U.S. persons—are thus acquired, even
though they could not be independently collected had they been transiting the
179.

See, e.g., Banks, supra note 10, at 1639, 1645 n.47 (emphasizing the difficulty of ascertaining
user location).

180.

See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.

181.

See Memorandum Opinion, [Caption Redacted], [Docket No. Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618,
at *10 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (alteration in original) (“[The] NSA’s upstream Internet
collection devices are generally incapable of distinguishing between transactions containing
only a single discrete communication to, from, or about a tasked selector and transactions
containing multiple discrete communications, not all of which may be to, from, or about a
tasked selector.”).
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fiber-optic lines on their own. This highlights the difficulty of effectively
implementing any user- or identity-based distinctions, at least at the stage at
which data is collected.
The intermingling of data also raises questions about how to ascertain the
relevant data user for purposes of making a territoriality determination and
thereby ascertaining which rules apply. Consider, for example, a Google
document that is not yet accessible to the general public but potentially
accessible to multiple private users. Alternatively, consider a multiperson chat
that involves multiple users all employing encryption and thus exhibiting an
intention to keep the chat private. Even if one could ascertain the location and
identity of each user who accesses the Google document, or the location and
identity of all participants in the multiperson chat, whose location and identity
should count for purposes of determining the applicable rules? Should, for
example, the Fourth Amendment protect the search and seizure of the Google
document if any one of the users is located in the United States or is a U.S.
citizen or noncitizen with sufficient voluntary connections to the United
States? Or should the Google document be protected only if the target of the
search or all of the users fall into this category of protected persons under the
Fourth Amendment? 182
Congress considered this issue in relation to section 702 collection and
placed a prohibition on the acquisition of “wholly domestic
communications”—those communications in which the sender and all
recipients are located in the United States.183 This means that if one sends an email to multiple family members, one of whom happens to be temporarily
overseas, the message is treated differently than if it had not included that
single overseas recipient. Such a rule increases the aperture of potential
collection for purposes of gathering foreign intelligence information. But why
should this be? Why should the restriction apply only when all the recipients
are in the United States, as opposed to whenever one of the intended recipients
is based in the United States? These and other related difficulties in
ascertaining whose location and identity is determinative of applicable rules
further highlight the complexity of implementing the territorial- and identitybased distinctions required by law.

182.

See also Kerr, supra note 11, at 317 (warning of the possibility of “conflicting standards when
more than one person has [Fourth Amendment] rights in a communication”).

183.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(4) (2012); Memorandum Opinion, 2011 WL 10945618, at *11.
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E. Third-Party Issues
Owners of tangible property tend to retain such property themselves, with
only a small portion turned over to third parties to manage or execute. By
contrast, we delegate large quantities of our digital property to the control of
others. Vast quantities of electronic data are now held, or otherwise controlled,
by third parties, including ISPs, cloud service providers, and companies that
maintain and operate the fiber-optic cables that make up the Internet’s
backbone. Moreover, it is the third party, not the user, that generally makes the
critical decisions about the path by which data travels or where it is stored. It is
also the third party, not the user, that is often called on by government officials
to collect and produce the sought-after data.
According to the third-party doctrine, data exposed to third parties is not
protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.184 The doctrine originates
from two 1970s Supreme Court opinions—Smith v. Maryland185 and United
States v. Miller.186 The quantity of data at stake in Smith and Miller was
necessarily limited by the relatively unsophisticated technology at the time the
cases were decided.187 Nowadays, however, it is no longer feasible to participate
in a digital world without exposing an incredible wealth of private
information—including one’s associations and private thoughts—to a third
party. As a result, the third-party doctrine has increasingly come under
attack.188 My aim here is not to resolve the difficult questions raised by the

184.

See Smith v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be betrayed.”).

185.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).

186.

425 U.S. 435 (1976).

187.

See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737 (discussing the collection of telephone numbers dialed on a single
day); Miller, 425 U.S. at 437-38 (discussing the collection of four months’ worth of bank
records).

188.

See, e.g., Colb, supra note 6, at 126-30; Richards, supra note 6, at 1117-19 (describing the
intuitive case for protection of third-party records); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61
STAN. L. REV. 101, 109-15 (2008) (discussing the untenability of the stranger principle);
Strandburg, supra note 10, at 619-21 (suggesting that technological change has rendered the
third-party doctrine untenable); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” (citations omitted)); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2013) (“As in Smith, the types of information at issue in this case
are relatively limited: phone numbers dialed, date, time, and the like. But the ubiquity of
phones has dramatically altered the quantity of information that is now available and, more
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third-party doctrine, but simply to note that the third-party issues create yet
another point of divergence between data and most other forms of tangible
property.
Such third-party control matters for two key reasons. First, it makes the
location of the third party (and not the location of the property) potentially
determinative of the rules that apply. In the Microsoft case, for example, the
government is arguing that because Microsoft is domiciled in the United
States, the government can compel the production of data under its control—
irrespective of the data’s location.189 Third-party control also offers a possible
way to reconcile the government’s position with respect to the proposed Rule
41 amendment—conceding that courts lack authority to authorize law
enforcement searches of extraterritorially located data—and its position in the
Microsoft case.190 Even if law enforcement agents could not themselves access
data located extraterritorially, the rules are different—or so the government
says—if a third party performs the search or seizure.191
Second, third-party control highlights the user’s lack of direct control over
his or her data and its location at any given moment. It is, of course, possible to
enter into contracts with third parties—or pass data localization laws—
ensuring that data will be stored in a particular location.192 But currently, most
data users do not retain such control over their data. In fact, the efficiency of
both the cloud and a global Internet depend, to a significant degree, on third
parties being able to move data around in the most expeditious manner,
without being constrained by user preferences and control.
iii. w h a t d o e s it a ll m e a n ?
As the preceding Part highlights, data’s unique characteristics raise
fundamental challenges to territoriality doctrine. They do so for three key
reasons. First, the arbitrariness, instability, and location independence of data
and its users challenge the assumption that data location should determine the
rules that apply. Why should privacy rights or law enforcement’s access to

importantly, what that information can tell the Government about people’s lives.” (footnote
omitted)).
189.

See Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 9, 26-30; see also supra notes 141-142 and
accompanying text.

190.

See supra Section I.C.1.

191.

But see Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 30-32 (arguing that Microsoft has essentially
been conscripted to do the government’s bidding and therefore is operating as an agent of
the government, subject to the same sets of rules).

192.

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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sought-after evidence turn on where data happens to be located at any given
moment, particularly given the near-instantaneous and seemingly random way
in which data moves from place to place?
Second, the intermingling of data means that it is often difficult, if not
impossible, to make the kind of fine-tuned, identity- and location-based
distinctions that Fourth Amendment and surveillance law demand. Even
absent the problem of multi-communication transactions, U.S. persons’ and
non-U.S. persons’ data is inevitably intermingled by virtue of the fact that we
live in an interconnected and globally networked world. Broad surveillance
programs and bulk collection significantly exacerbate this problem of
“incidental” collection.
Third, the location independence between the data and the government
agent accessing the data creates the possibility of actors in State A searching or
seizing data in State B without any readily apparent violation of State B’s
territorial integrity. From the perspective of State B, however, this is arguably a
violation of sovereignty since State A is determining when, and according to
what procedures and substantive standards, data located in State B can be
seized. Such unilateral seizure of data ignores longstanding efforts of nations—
including the United States—to establish sovereign control and regulation over
data within one’s own territory. It also creates a possible conflict of laws and
adds fuel to certain types of data localization movements.
This Part addresses the legal implications of these insights with respect to
the three doctrinal fields discussed in Part I: the reach of the Fourth
Amendment, the scope of permissible foreign intelligence surveillance, and the
territorial limits on the judiciary’s warrant authority. Whereas the government
continues to assume a territorial Fourth Amendment, I argue that data’s
mobility and interconnectedness undercut the foundation of Fourth
Amendment territoriality. Conversely, whereas the government argues, at least
in the context of the Microsoft case, that longstanding territorial-based
limitations on law enforcement jurisdiction should yield in the face of unterritorial data, I point to countervailing policy considerations and principles of
international law that, at a minimum, complicate the government’s position.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the answers to data’s un-territoriality
are not, and need not be, identical across the board. But whatever one decides
is the right solution, one thing is clear: data challenges the dominance of
territorial-based distinctions in the law, and these challenges must be
acknowledged and addressed.
A. The Fourth Amendment
I am not the first scholar to note the ways in which data challenges a
territorial Fourth Amendment. In a recent article in the Stanford Law Review,
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Kerr addresses “[t]he conflict between the territorial Fourth Amendment and
the facts of the global Internet.”193 But while recognizing the way in which
“Internet technologies . . . disrupt[] the prior relationship between person and
place,”194 Kerr assumes that the territorial-based distinctions announced in
Verdugo-Urquidez are correct.195 He thus applies his Fourth Amendment theory
of equilibrium adjustment—pursuant to which the Fourth Amendment adapts
to technological developments by maintaining the status quo balance of
government authority and privacy protections—to suggest a series of
adjustments that will maintain the territorial- and identity-based distinctions
of the Fourth Amendment.196
I instead suggest an alternative perspective, namely that data calls into
question the primacy of location and citizenship to the application of Fourth
Amendment rights. Even if one understands the term “the people” in the way
Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested in Verdugo-Urquidez—applying the Fourth
Amendment’s protections only to citizens and those with substantial
connections to the United States197—the mobility and intermingling of data
mean that territorial- and identity-based distinctions leave “the people”
insufficiently protected by a territorial Fourth Amendment, at least at the stage
at which data is acquired.198 This claim is even stronger if the term “the people”
is, as Justice Kennedy suggested,199 understood to emphasize the importance of
the right, rather than limit who can assert a claim. As David Gray suggests, the

193.

Kerr, supra note 11, at 289.

194.

Id. at 303.

195.

See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (“[T]he purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action
by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to
restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside the United States
territory.”); id. at 271 (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.”); supra Section I.A.

196.

Kerr, supra note 11, at 303-04. See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of
the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (introducing Kerr’s theory of
equilibrium-adjustment, which posits that the Supreme Court adjusts the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection in response to new facts in order to restore the status quo level of
protection).

197.

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.

198.

But see Daskal, supra note 32 (raising concerns about Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s reach); Kent, supra note 23, at 515 (noting that
there is no evidence of any detailed public debate about the choice of words between
“person” and “the people” and suggesting that we therefore ought to be skeptical of our
ability to draw any significance from the difference in terms).

199.

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276.
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key question is not whether the particular target of the government action is
entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, but whether the government action
infringes on the Fourth Amendment interests of the people in toto—something
that the search or seizure of intermingled data does, regardless of the location
of the acquisition, the location of the target, or the target’s identity.200
The following discussion responds to Kerr’s suggested equilibrium
adjustments and considers two alternative responses: first, a presumptive
Fourth Amendment; and second, a universalist Fourth Amendment.
1. An Equilibrium-Adjusted Fourth Amendment
In applying a series of equilibrium adjustments to the Fourth Amendment,
Kerr asks critical questions about how to apply a territorial Fourth Amendment
in a globally interconnected world. He examines whether a person’s online
contacts constitute sufficient connections to the United States to trigger the
application of the Fourth Amendment.201 And he asks how the law should
apply to the monitoring of communications between those with Fourth
Amendment rights and those without.202 Yet, his analysis presumes the
continued desirability of a territorial Fourth Amendment. As a result, Kerr fails
to fully acknowledge the degree to which data shakes the very foundation of
Fourth Amendment territoriality.
Among other proposed adjustments, Kerr suggests that Fourth
Amendment protections kick in so long as either the sender or the recipient of a
communication is a U.S. person or located in the United States—those
individuals entitled to protection under current Fourth Amendment
doctrine.203 This is in contrast to the government’s current approach, which
looks exclusively to the identity and location of the target of the search in
determining the rules governing collection.204 The problem is, as Kerr himself
acknowledges, it will not always be feasible to ascertain the location and
identity of all senders and recipients of a particular communication. Kerr thus
proposes a good faith standard: so long as the government makes a good faith
determination of the sender and recipient’s status, the search or seizure will be

200.

See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.

201.

Kerr, supra note 11, at 307 (arguing that online contacts do not suffice).

202.

Id. at 313-15 (concluding that the government ought to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards
when it monitors communications between those with Fourth Amendment rights and those
without, but restricting this insight to communications in transit).

203.

See id. at 308-11.

204.

See supra Section I.A.
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deemed constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.205 But
depending on how “good faith” is interpreted, this could become the exception
that swallows the rule: is preponderance of the evidence enough? Does good
faith permit a presumption (akin to that currently employed by the NSA) that
unknown parties to a communication are noncitizens lacking Fourth
Amendment rights?206
Of additional concern, Kerr’s proposed adjustment—consistent with
longstanding Fourth Amendment doctrine—applies only to data in transit. It
is, after all, well established that a sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
mail expires once the mail arrives at its destination.207 At that point, the Fourth
Amendment inquiry shifts exclusively to the recipient, who becomes the sole
party with a continuing reasonable expectation of privacy in the
communication. The law has not yet settled what it means for e-mail—as
opposed to snail mail—to reach its destination. If simply arriving at the
recipient’s server is what constitutes “delivery,” then Kerr’s proposed
adjustment will provide little-to-no protection to a key subset of “the people”
whom the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect—U.S. persons sending emails to non-U.S. persons who lack Fourth Amendment rights.208 Such
communications could be seized the minute they arrived at the recipient’s
server, without any requirement that the government obtain a warrant or even
engage in a seizure that is reasonable.209 But even if “delivery” is understood as
receipt by the intended recipient (and not just arrival on the recipient’s server),
the sender would still lack any Fourth Amendment interest in the information
once it has been opened or downloaded onto the recipient’s device.210

205.

Kerr, supra note 11, at 308-10.

206.

See also David G. Delaney, Widening the Aperture on Fourth Amendment Interests: A Comment
on Orin Kerr’s The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9,
10-11 (2015) (describing the complicated tailoring of good faith rules that will need to take
place when dealing with the multiple government actors conducting monitoring in
cyberspace).

207.

See United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing cases); 6 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.3(f) (5th ed.
2012).

208.

Kerr acknowledges this problem. See Kerr, supra note 11, at 315 (noting that if arrival at the
server constitutes delivery, “the government will be able to freely monitor the e-mail
account of a person who lacks Fourth Amendment rights under Verdugo-Urquidez regardless
of whether that person communicates with those who have Fourth Amendment rights”).

209.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(2) (2012) (prohibiting the targeting of a person reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States for the purpose of gathering information about a
particular, known target reasonably believed to be located within the United States).

210.

In recent litigation, DOJ has helpfully hinted that the destination point is receipt by the
actual recipient, not just arrival at the ISP’s server, which means that the sender retains a
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Thus, even with the kind of helpful adjustments suggested by Kerr, the
intermingling of U.S. and non-U.S. persons’ information creates a high
likelihood of both error and incidental collection. Put another way, even under
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conception of the Fourth Amendment, “the people”
are insufficiently protected.
2. A Presumptive Fourth Amendment
A much more robust response—and the one I prefer—presumes that the
Fourth Amendment applies regardless of whether the collection takes place
inside or outside the United States, and regardless of whether the target is a
U.S. person or not. The presumption can be rebutted if, and only if, the
government establishes that none of the parties to the communication is
a U.S. person. The presumption also applies regardless of whether the
communication is in transit or not. In practice, this means that bulk collection,
wherever it takes place, will fall within the Fourth Amendment’s ambit;
cross-border communications will be covered by the Fourth Amendment,
irrespective of the identity of the particular target; and most foreign
intelligence surveillance will also trigger a Fourth Amendment inquiry, as it
will not be feasible in most cases to show that none of the parties to
communication is a U.S. person. By contrast, the surveillance of North Korean
diplomats in North Korea or the targeted collection on Al-Nusra Front leaders
in Syria is unlikely to trigger the Fourth Amendment—although there may be
policy reasons to expand protection to these circumstances.
To be clear, this is not the same as saying that a warrant is required every
time the government searches or seizes electronic communications for foreign
intelligence purposes, or that all surveillance necessarily implicates the Fourth
Amendment. There is, I believe, a legitimate foreign intelligence exception to
the warrant requirement in some circumstances. Rather, my argument is that
Fourth Amendment protections, however defined, ought to apply to U.S.
person targets and non-U.S. person targets alike, absent clear and convincing
evidence that collection does not encompass communications to or from a U.S.
person or include other data (such as stored documents) that have been
generated in whole or in part by a U.S. person.
To be more concrete: if a warrant based on probable cause is required to
collect the content of electronic communications, it should presumptively be
required across the board, for both citizen and noncitizen targets—irrespective
reasonable expectation of privacy until the communication is actually received by the
recipient. See Government’s Unclassified Response to Defendant’s Alternative Motion for
Suppression of Evidence & a New Trial at 48 n.32, United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 4792313, at *24 (D. Or. June 24, 2014).

383

the yale law journal

125:326

2015

of the location of the data or the target. Absent a determination that the
communication exclusively takes place between non-U.S. persons, the warrant
requirement should apply. Conversely, if a warrant is not required to collect
certain types of information (such as certain types of foreign intelligence
information or dialed phone numbers) this exception should also apply across
the board—to citizens and noncitizens alike—regardless of where the data or
the target is located.
Such a proposal will undoubtedly engender objections. It would be, after
all, a dramatic change in the way the government thinks about its obligations
toward non-U.S. persons outside the United States. However, the United
States is already moving in that direction, albeit as a matter of policy, not law.
The recently issued PPD-28 directs the intelligence community to establish
post-acquisition limits on the dissemination and retention of collected data.211
It requires that these safeguards apply “equally to the personal information of
all persons, regardless of nationality,” to “the maximum extent feasible
consistent with the national security.”212 The policy directive applies across the
board, even in those situations where all parties to a communication are nonU.S. persons. A presumptive Fourth Amendment would thus extend the
already existing policy of post-acquisition restrictions on use, dissemination,
and retention to the level of collection itself. And it would do so as a matter of
law.
Some will object that applying the Fourth Amendment’s protections to the
collection of noncitizens’ data overseas will impede the government’s ability to
gather critical foreign intelligence information essential to the nation’s security.
But as already described, the Fourth Amendment need not—and in fact does
not—act as a chokehold with respect to the gathering of foreign intelligence
information. The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement—
described as the “touchstone” of Fourth Amendment analysis213—is a flexible
standard that takes into account the governmental interest at stake. Even in the
context of domestic law enforcement, where Fourth Amendment interests are

211.

See PPD-28, supra note 19.

212.

See id. § 4(a); see also David Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y, 209, 289 (2014) (describing PPD-28 as representing an
“unprecedented change in U.S. intelligence policy, at least at the rhetorical level,” but noting
that “[t]he degree of substantive change that will follow from PPD-28 is less certain”);
Benjamin Wittes, The President’s Speech and PPD-28: A Guide for the Perplexed, LAWFARE
(Jan. 20, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/01/the-presidents
-speech-and-ppd-28-a-guide-for-the-perplexed [http://perma.cc/C599-Q7ZX] (suggesting
that the policies required are already largely consistent with current practice).

213.

See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”).
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at their zenith, the doctrine generally provides law enforcement agents
significant latitude to search and seize.214 A presumptive Fourth Amendment
still permits the government to search and seize the data of noncitizens for a
wide array of law enforcement and intelligence purposes; it simply prohibits
unreasonable searches or seizures of data any time a U.S persons’
communications are potentially implicated. This is a necessary means of
indirectly protecting “the people” who fall within the Fourth Amendment’s
ambit.
Others will suggest that minimization rules restricting the use, retention,
and dissemination of acquired U.S. persons’ information sufficiently address
the Fourth Amendment concerns I have identified. But while minimization
rules are undoubtedly important, they protect separate interests. Whereas
acquisition rules define the government’s ability to gather information,
minimization rules govern what the government can do with the information
after its acquisition. Acquisition itself has the capacity to both alter the balance
of power between the governed and the government and to chill speech and
association, among other consequentialist harms. The acquisition of data
should thus be understood as independently implicating the Fourth
Amendment rights of U.S. persons, regardless of the existence—or not—of
other separate restrictions on use, retention, or dissemination. In fact,
Congress has implicitly recognized the ways in which acquisition itself
implicates the rights and interests of “the people” in its detailed rules
governing the acquisition of electronic and stored communications.215
To reiterate, this position does not assume all electronic surveillance or
seizure of data triggers the Fourth Amendment. Nor does it assume that a
warrant is required any time the Fourth Amendment is triggered. There is,
after all, an important and ongoing debate about when the Fourth Amendment
protects electronic communications and other types of data.216 The claim is
simply that whatever answers we arrive at should presumptively apply to U.S.
persons and non-U.S. persons alike, regardless of whether the target of the
214.

See, e.g., Kerr, New Technologies, supra note 10, at 828 (noting the “relatively modest and
deferential Fourth Amendment in the area of developing technologies”); Richards, supra
note 6, at 1117-18 (addressing the breadth of the third-party doctrine); Warrantless Searches
and Seizures, supra note 39 (describing the many exceptions to the warrant requirement).

215.

See supra Sections I.B, I.C.

216.

See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing ongoing debate on the third-party
doctrine); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 308-09 (1972)
(explicitly leaving open the possibility of a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement); In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (alteration in
original) (holding that “a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement exists” in specified circumstances).
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acquisition or the data being acquired is based in the United States—absent a
determination that all parties to the communication are non-U.S. persons. In
many cases, noncitizens will be entitled to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, not because they are subsumed within “the people,” but in order
to protect citizens and other persons with sufficient connections to the United
States that current constitutional doctrine teaches are entitled to the
Amendment’s protections.
3. A Universalist Fourth Amendment
Another possible response—what I am labeling the universalist approach—
involves a total rejection of the Fourth Amendment’s territorial- and identitybased limitations. Proponents of this universalist approach have two dominant
rationales. The first is to provide a bright-line prophylactic response to the risk
of incidental collection without the possibility of exceptions. The second is the
larger aim of repudiating Chief Justice Rehnquist’s conception of “the people”
as limited to those with sufficient voluntary connections to the United States.217
There are two possible versions of the universalist approach. Under the
stronger version, what I call “pure universalism,” all targets of U.S. actions are
treated equally. Under the second, the Fourth Amendment applies regardless
of the location or identity of the target, but location or identity still play a role
in determining how the Fourth Amendment applies (e.g., when a warrant is
required).218 As is obvious, only the first version (pure universalism) fully
responds to the unique features of data identified in this Article. The second
approach applies the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens located outside the
United States, but then reintroduces territorial and identity-based inquiries
into a later stage of analysis. After all, problems of target identification and
intermingling apply regardless of the stage at which the inquiry takes place.
This universalist approach differs from the presumptive approach in that it
would apply the Fourth Amendment even to the collection of “wholly”
noncitizen, nonresident communications. It would thus apply even when the
government could show that the acquisition covers North Koreans talking to

217.

See, e.g., Alec D. Walen, Fourth Amendment Rights for Nonresident Aliens, GER. L.J.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 21-25), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533582 [http://perma
.cc/B25Z-SW9E] (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist misinterpreted the meaning of “the
people”).

218.

See, e.g., Delaney, supra note 206, at 14-15 (suggesting support for a universally applicable
Fourth Amendment in cyberspace but also suggesting that the standards as to what satisfies
the Fourth Amendment may differ for U.S. citizens and noncitizens, thereby making
identity determinative of how the Fourth Amendment applies).
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North Koreans and that no U.S.-person’s communications would be
incidentally acquired.
While the universalist approach has the arguable benefit of simplicity, it
also runs headlong into current doctrinal understandings that limit the
application of the Fourth Amendment to those with substantial voluntary
connections to the United States. Regardless of what one thinks of Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s fairly cursory explanation of the textual, historical, and
normative justifications for his limited conception of “the people,” his
reasoning has since become entrenched in the doctrine, with lower courts and
legislators repeatedly relying upon his analysis.219 The judicial branch,
executive branch, and Congress are not likely to embrace readily the idea that
the Fourth Amendment applies to communications that are known to
exclusively involve noncitizens located outside the United States.
By comparison, a presumptive Fourth Amendment achieves much of what
a universalist Fourth Amendment strives toward, but does so without
requiring a total overhaul of current doctrine. The presumptive approach
recognized that in a world of highly mobile and intermingled data, VerdugoUrquidez is failing on its own terms. As a result, a set of strong presumptions is
needed to protect “the people” who are, according to the Court’s reasoning in
Vergudo-Urquidez, entitled to the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Thus,
unless the government is engaged in the targeted collection of communications
between extraterritorially located noncitizens (such as the targeted collection of
communications between North Koreans), the Fourth Amendment will
presumptively apply.
B. Foreign Surveillance: Additional Considerations
Recommendations with respect to the statutory requirements governing
foreign intelligence surveillance track those made with respect to the Fourth
Amendment. The insight of the 1978 Congress is prescient in this regard: the
best way to ensure sufficient protections for Americans is to provide sufficient
protections for all, at least at the acquisition stage.220 This insight has only
grown more salient over time, as the Internet has become a truly global
network. Congress should thus rewrite FISA to set universally applicable
requirements for acquisition that no longer depend on the location of the data
or the identity of the target.
Again, my purpose here is not to lay out the specific rules that ought to be
adopted—that is beyond the scope of this Article. Perhaps warrants should be
219.

See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.

220.

See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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required; perhaps not. Or perhaps there is a middle ground, in which warrants
are required for certain types of acquisition. But whatever the rules, they ought
to be applied universally, absent clear and convincing evidence that none of the
parties to the communication is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident.
At the same time, Congress should turn its attention to the critically
important—and largely neglected—question of use.221 Who can access the
data? Based on what substantive and procedural rules? In what circumstances
can data be disseminated? How long can the data be retained? As of now, the
statutory scheme focuses almost entirely on the rules governing acquisition,
giving scant attention to rules governing the access and use of collected data.
For example, while Congress mandates the development of so-called
minimization rules to govern the access to, retention, and dissemination of
U.S. persons’ information, it delegates the development of these specific
procedures to the Attorney General, subject to approval by the FISC.222 The
overarching requirements are written at such a level of generality that they
effectively delegate all the key details to the executive branch.223 This is a
mistake. So long as foreign intelligence collection continues to be as sweeping
as it has been of late, minimization rules and use restrictions are critical. Thus,
while this Article (like Congress) is focused primarily on acquisition and not
use, the two must go hand-in-hand.
Meanwhile, as already stated, Congress ought to embrace the reality of
data’s intermingling and rewrite its acquisition rules to turn on factors (such as
type of information being collected) that do not depend on the identity or
location of the target. As it does so, it should consider the definition of foreign
intelligence. The broader the definition, the harder it will be to justify a
warrant exception for foreign intelligence surveillance, particularly given its
application to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons alike. Conversely, the
narrower and more limited the definition of foreign intelligence, the easier it
will be to find support for warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes.

221.

See, e.g., Banks, supra note 10, at 1660, 1637 (noting that “[b]y its nature, the FAA shifts
nearly all the burden of civil liberties protection to postcollection minimization,” and urging
Congress to legislate more robust minimization requirements); Craig Mundie, Privacy
Pragmatism: Focus on Data Use, Not Data Collection, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar./Apr. 2014),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2014-02-12/privacy-pragmatism [http://perma.cc/
HA9F-ZDEX]. These use questions tend to fall under the rubric of post-acquisition
minimization rules, discussed in Section I.B.

222.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (2012).

223.

See id. § 1801(h) (defining the required “minimization procedures”).
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C. The Microsoft Case: Warrant Jurisdiction and the Stored Communications
Act
Territoriality with respect to warrant jurisdiction serves a very different
purpose than it does in the Fourth Amendment context. Whereas territoriality
under the Fourth Amendment demarcates who is—and is not—entitled to basic
privacy protections vis-à-vis the U.S. government, territoriality for purposes of
warrant jurisdiction defines the geographic scope of court-approved law
enforcement authority to act. Territorial-based limitations for purposes of
warrant jurisdiction stem from the longstanding principle that nations are
prohibited from unilaterally exercising their law enforcement jurisdiction in
another nation’s territory, as well as an awareness of the diplomatic
consequences and practical difficulties of doing so.
Notably, both sides in the Microsoft case argue that they respect the
territorial-based limits of the government’s warrant authority. They just differ
as to the question of whether certain actions occur territorially or
extraterritorially, at least for purposes of the SCA. Microsoft argues by analogy
to the territorial-based limits applicable to warrants issued under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41 and rules governing the search and seizure of tangible
property.224 According to Microsoft, it would be an extraterritorial seizure if the
government accessed the data directly; thus, it remains an extraterritorial
seizure if instead of seizing the data directly, the government compels
Microsoft to do so.225 The government, by contrast, points to the text and
structure of the SCA to suggest that the term “warrant” in the SCA is actually a
“hybrid warrant”—part warrant and part subpoena. Analogizing to the rules
governing subpoenas, the government argues that it is the location of the entity
(Microsoft) with controls over the data that matters.226 Both sides cite policy
reasons as to why their interpretation is the correct one.227
224.

See Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 36-37, 41-45.

225.

In support of this position, Microsoft emphasizes that Congress’s use of the word “warrant”
should be understood to mean what it says and not “subpoena” or some hybrid warrantsubpoena as the government suggests. See id. at 38 (“Congress must be presumed to have
been aware of these plain—and plainly different—meanings when it used these terms in
sequential provisions of ECPA. The district court erred in indulging exactly the opposite
presumption—that Congress imported into the word ‘warrant’ principles that courts had
applied only to the very different device called a ‘subpoena.’”).

226.

See Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 9; see also In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft, 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“Although [the SCA] uses the term ‘warrant’ and refers to the use of warrant procedures,
the resulting order is not a conventional warrant; rather, the order is a hybrid: part search
warrant and part subpoena.”).

227.

See Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 41-57; Brief for Appellee, supra note 1, at 48-57.
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The Microsoft case thus pits the location of data against the location of
access, requiring an answer as to which controls, at least for purposes of
warrant jurisdiction under the SCA. From a pure policy perspective, both sides
have strong claims. Yet neither approach is fully satisfactory.228 Microsoft’s
position—pursuant to which law enforcement access to evidence depends on
the location of data—yields bizarre results. Under Microsoft’s approach, law
enforcement access to evidence depends on an ISP’s decisions about the most
cost-effective and efficient storage location at any given moment. Nefarious
players could manipulate data location to their advantage, seeking out
companies that store data in nations unwilling, or perhaps technologically
unable, to cooperate with official government-to-government requests for
electronic evidence. ISPs may also have business incentives—based on
customer demand—to move data to locations where cooperation with U.S. law
enforcement is minimal, thus creating significant barriers for law enforcement
agents investigating crimes. Moreover, the Microsoft position, while at times
framed as an alternative to data localization, would likely fuel a certain kind of
data localization; foreign governments would increasingly demand that ISPs
store their nationals’ data within their jurisdiction so as to avoid the reach of
foreign law enforcement.229
But the government’s answer—that the location of access controls—carries
its own set of significant costs. It generates a system of borderless law
enforcement, but without agreed-upon standards and procedures. The
standards and procedures of the requesting state (the United States in this
case) are effectively imposed upon the state in which the data is stored
(Ireland), without considering the applicable privacy protections and rules
governing law enforcement’s access to data in the state where the data is
stored. This has several negative policy implications.
First, it conflicts with the international law prohibition against the
unilateral exercise of extraterritorial law enforcement jurisdiction and ignores
the longstanding sovereign interest in setting privacy protections for property

228.

The textual and structural claims are of obvious import as well. Microsoft makes a strong
case that, given Congress’s silence on the issue, the statute ought to be construed in
accordance with international law. And, as stated above, international law is widely
understood to prohibit the kind of unilateral exercise of law enforcement in another state’s
territory that the government’s position would permit. See Brief for Appellant, supra note
144, at 34-35.

229.

See, e.g., Chander & Lê, supra note 154 (describing the dangers of data localization); Jonah
Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations for
U.S. Policymakers and Business Leaders, THE HAGUE INST. FOR GLOBAL JUST. (May 1, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2430275 [http://perma.cc/D2FC-F29Y] (describing the rise of data
localization movements and analyzing the key motivating factors).
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within the nation’s territory.230 Second, and relatedly, there is a legitimate
concern about the reciprocal effects on the United States’ ability to safeguard
stored data held within the nation’s borders, including the data of its own
citizens.231 The United States’ position may seem the correct one when it is
U.S. law enforcement accessing the data, and the data is being accessed for
legitimate law enforcement needs pursuant to a finding of probable cause. But
what happens when another nation (let’s say China or Russia) seeks to compel
a service provider operating within its territorial borders to turn over data
stored within the United States regarding a dissident human rights activist?232
This is not hypothetical. The United Kingdom, for example, has adopted
legislation that authorizes government officials to compel ISPs to directly turn
over data stored in the United States, without regard to the SCA’s requirement
of a warrant and probable cause.233
Third, such a scenario—with both the requesting state and the state where
data is stored claiming jurisdiction over the data—creates an almost inevitable
conflict of laws. ISPs can find themselves caught between two conflicting legal

230.

See supra Section I.C.

231.

See Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 17-18; Brief of Amicus Curiae AT&T Corp. et al. in
Support of Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 2, In re Warrant To Search a Certain E-mail
Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d Cir. Dec. 15,
2014) (warning that “[i]f foreign governments were to respond in kind, they could, for
example, order a foreign Microsoft subsidiary to obtain and disclose to foreign authorities
any private customer information . . . applying only foreign legal standards to the question,”
and thereby undercutting U.S.-based statutory protections designed to “ensure the
continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment”); Brief of BSA et al. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 16, In re Warrant, slip op. [hereinafter BSA
Amicus Brief] (warning that “the government’s approach—if upheld by this Court—is likely
to produce a substantial reduction in Americans’ privacy as well” since “[o]ther countries
will assert the same authority that the government does . . . contending that their domestic
legal processes may compel production of Americans’ data stored in this country”).

232.

Cf. Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation,
22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 582 (2012) (“The geographically
unlimited regulation and enforcement of cyberlaw 2.0 has been liberating only when it is
‘our’ laws that are being enforced; as soon as other countries enforce ‘their’ laws that are
contrary to our beliefs, we begin to look for ways to protect our own value system.”).

233.

See Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, c.27, § 4(4), (Eng.). The legislation
specifies that “regard is to be had” to a possible conflict of laws, although the legislation
does not say whether and in what situations the laws of the nation in which the data is
located would trump. Id.; see also INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT,
REPORT ON THE INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE MURDER OF FUSILIER LEE RIGBY, 2014, HC
795, at 151 (UK) (describing a key goal of the legislation as permitting access to otherwise
difficult-to-obtain data held by U.S.-based providers).
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obligations, perhaps even with criminal consequences.234 While this is not
new—and there is an entire body of law designed to deal with such
conflicts235—it puts ISPs in an increasingly difficult position. Fourth, the U.S.
position risks its own form of data localization, pursuant to which nations
require that their nationals store data with locally-based ISPs so as to ensure
that the data is subject to that nation’s jurisdiction. (This is in contrast to the
localization movements that demand the local storage of data; this type of
movement focuses on the ISP location.) The economic fallout for U.S.
businesses could be significant,236 and the Internet’s efficiency would suffer as
234.

See, e.g., Amazon Amici, supra note 144, at 17-18 (warning that “allowing the decision below
to stand would leave cloud services providers to confront the Hobson’s choice of either (a)
disobeying the ECPA warrant in order to comply with the privacy laws of the country where
the relevant documents are located or (b) violating those laws in order to comply with the
warrant”).

235.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS passim (AM. LAW INST. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW passim (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Lea
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and
Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 12-14 (1988) (explaining the
relationship between, and the scope of, the respective restatements); Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 318 (1982) (arguing that international conflict of
law problems should be evaluated “in the light of effective principles of transnational
organization, not solely in terms of whether a given decision may create short-term
disharmony between the nations involved”); see also Berman, supra note 10, at 329-423
(describing the range of choice of law and conflict of law issues arising in the context of an
increasingly interconnected world, as well as proposed responses).

236.

See BSA Amicus Brief, supra note 231, at 18-19 (warning of the costs to the cloud computing
industry and U.S. business in particular if businesses and individuals believe that the use of
U.S.-based providers means a loss of privacy and confidentiality); Chander & Lê, supra note
154 (detailing the negative impacts of localization movements). These are not hypothetical
concerns. In response to revelations about the scope of U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance,
the government of Germany has announced plans to cancel a contract with Verizon, Brazil
has abandoned a plan to use Microsoft Outlook for government e-mail, and Brazil and the
European Union have decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal. See
Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from
-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html [http://perma.cc/W4BN-J89Q];
Anton Troianovski & Danny Yadron, German Government Ends Verizon Contract, WALL
ST. J. (June 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-government-ends-verizon
-contract-1403802226 [http://perma.cc/SU48-CWFT]. In fact, recent reports suggest that
related concerns about U.S. surveillance practices for foreign intelligence purposes could
cost the American cloud computing industry twenty-two billion dollars to thirty-five billion
dollars over the next three years as foreign customers abandon or choose other providers.
See Daniel Castro, How Much Will PRISM Cost the U.S. Cloud Computing Industry?, INFO.
TECH. & INNOVATION F. (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5QXK-DJJP]; Danielle Kehl et al., Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on
the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity, NEW AM.’S OPEN TECH. INST. (2014),
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well.237 Finally, and ironically, if such movements are ultimately successful in
creating closed-off or locally-controlled networks, law enforcement access to
sought-after data will be compromised. The very thing that the government is
seeking to do in the Microsoft case—compel a U.S.-based ISP to turn over data
located extraterritorially—will be nearly impossible because that data will be
held by foreign providers. Put differently, the government’s insistence on
unilateral access to the data may undermine its ability to ever compel
production of such data.
Taken together, these concerns highlight the need for new cross-border
mechanisms that facilitate law enforcement access to data, yet also respect the
sovereign interest in setting privacy protections and controlling law
enforcement operations within one’s jurisdiction.238 There are several ways to
achieve this balance. Here, I address some of the key considerations.
The most discussed—and also minimally responsive—proposal is simply to
expand the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) system, pursuant to
which law enforcement officials can make formal requests for cross-border law
enforcement assistance.239 It is, after all, Microsoft’s position that the U.S.
government is obliged to go through the MLAT with Ireland to request the
sought-after data, and that its failure to do so may itself violate international
law.240 This is also Ireland’s position.241 But the MLAT system has historically
been slow and clumsy, which is precisely why the government is seeking to get
the data directly from the ISPs. The United States, for example, takes an
average of ten months to respond to law enforcement requests made pursuant

http://www.newamerica.org/downloads/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/3HCT-GZPM]. While these reactions are primarily motivated by the scope of the United
States’ foreign intelligence surveillance, a rule allowing U.S. law enforcement to reach
unilaterally into other nations’ jurisdictions may exacerbate these reactions.
237.

See Chander & Lê, supra note 154, at 679-82; Hill, supra note 229, at 4.

238.

See, e.g., Brad Smith, Time for an International Convention on Government Access to
Data, MICROSOFT DIGITAL CONST. (Jan. 20, 2014), http://digitalconstitution.com/time
-international-convention-government-access-data [http://perma.cc/W8J3-YYVG].

239.

See, e.g., Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Re-Engineering the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty Process (May 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Andrew K.
Woods, Data Beyond Borders: Mutual Legal Assistance in the Internet Age, GLOBAL
NETWORK INITIATIVE, (2015), http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI
%20MLAT%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/PA6M-XVLZ].

240.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 17, 57-60.

241.

See Brief for Ireland as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 4, 7, In re Warrant To Search
a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., No. 14-2985-CV (2d
Cir. Dec. 23, 2014).
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to the MLAT process; other nations take longer.242 Moreover, MLAT coverage
is not universal; for instance, the United States has MLATs with only about
half the countries in the world.243 These processes can, and clearly should, be
improved. One potential model, the European Convention on Cybercrime
(commonly known as the “Budapest Convention”), provides a mechanism for
nations to expedite and facilitate preservation orders and cross-border sharing
of information related to cybercrime;244 this can be expanded to cover other
criminal matters as well. Increased resources, including money and personnel,
are also needed. Legislation currently pending in Congress mandates the
creation of an online tracking system;245 other nations should consider
adopting online tracking systems as well.
However, MLAT reform in and of itself is not a remedy to the issues raised
by the Microsoft case. After all, the MLAT system provides a mechanism for one
government to formally request data subject to another sovereign’s
jurisdiction. It thus kicks in where jurisdiction ends. One still needs to answer
the key underlying question: when and in what circumstances a sovereign can
claim lawful jurisdiction over data, even if that data is physically located
outside its territory. If (as is often assumed and as argued by Microsoft)246 the
location of data controls for purposes of the MLAT, then MLAT reform is only
a partial solution at best. Such a response fails to account for the mobility,
manipulability, and divisibility of data addressed in detail in Part II of this
Article.

242.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., PRESIDENT’S REV. GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’N
TECH., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 226-29 (2013), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [http://perma
.cc/36EE-6J9F] (noting that the United States takes an average of ten months to respond to
official requests made through the MLAT process for e-mail records and recommending
that the United States streamline and improve the MLAT process); Jonah Force Hill,
Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J.
(Jan. 28, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat
-reform-for-the-digital-age [http://perma.cc/F5M5-APAS] (“[I]t takes an average of ten
months for DOJ to process MLAT requests, and can take years. Foreign countries’ MLAT
requests are similarly drawn out, and can take far longer.”).

243.

See 1 BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENF’T AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: DRUG AND CHEMICAL CONTROL
(2012), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187109.pdf [http://perma.cc/FN5G
-D2C2] (listing countries with whom the United States has entered MLATs).

244.

Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime arts. 17-18, 32, opened for signature Nov. 23,
2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-11 (2006), E.T.S. No. 185 (entered into force July 1, 2004).

245.

The Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Abroad (LEADS) Act, S. 512, 114th Cong.
§ 4(a)(1)(B) (2015).

246.

See Brief for Appellant, supra note 144, at 57-58.
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Alternative jurisdictional triggers need to be considered, such as the place
where the company controlling the data operates or maintains its headquarters;
user nationality; or user location. Jurisdiction could also be based on the nature
of the crime and the requesting government’s interest in prosecution, rather
than, or in addition to, other possible factors. My goal here is not to rank or
comprehensively evaluate the various options—each of which carries its own
challenges—but simply to identify some of the possible choices.
As a matter of process, it seems these jurisdictional questions are best dealt
with through a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements among a handful
of like-minded nations. While some are calling for an international treaty as a
way to resolve such questions,247 it will be hard—if not impossible—to achieve
broad international consensus on these issues in the short term. Any agreement
that did emerge would almost certainly result in a watering down of
protections, at least as compared to the warrant standard for content data
stored in the United States.248 Bilateral and small multilateral agreements
would allow the United States and other key partners to begin to set the
applicable jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive requirements, without
having to try to achieve total consensus as to the outcome. If successful, these
agreements would establish a precedent that would be mimicked by others,
eventually coalescing into broadly applicable international norms and
standards.
As to the substance of the agreements, a few key considerations are in order.
First, it seems that one of the key problems stems from a disconnect between
the jurisdictional tests for data protection and data compulsion. The United
States, for example, acknowledges territorial-based limitations on its

247.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 238; Kate Westmoreland, A New International Convention on
International Legal Cooperation, ACSBLOG (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/a
-new-international-convention-on-international-legal-cooperation [http://perma.cc/3ZMB
-YL56] (calling for a new international convention, but also acknowledging the difficulties
in doing so and suggesting a range of shorter-term measures as well).
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An alternative—but highly implausible—response is to try to bypass these difficult
jurisdictional questions, at least in certain types of cases, through the creation of a new
global warrant system for data. But apart from the almost insurmountable logistical
difficulties (i.e., who would issue the warrant and how would national law enforcement
agencies trigger the application of such a warrant?), it is nearly impossible to conceive of a
set of internationally agreed-upon procedural and substantive standards. Any such
agreement would almost certainly involve a dilution of the United States’ standard of a
warrant based on probable cause, meaning other nations could presumably gain access to
data that U.S. agents could only obtain upon meeting the heightened Fourth Amendment
requirements. Moreover, even if such a system were established, it would presumably only
apply to certain types of requests or cases, still leaving the key jurisdictional questions
unresolved.
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regulatory authority under the SCA,249 yet the government asserts (in the
Microsoft case) that it can compel production of data, wherever located, so long
as it has jurisdiction over the provider. It is precisely this double standard that
is causing the potential conflicts of law and sovereignty issues raised by the
Microsoft case.250 As much as is feasible given the potential divergence between
regulatory and compulsory process goals, nations should adopt jurisdictional
tests that apply across the board—to both regulation and compulsion alike.251
Second, a key set of questions arises as to the substantive and procedural
mechanisms by which one nation can demand production of data located in
another nation’s jurisdiction (however that is ultimately defined). Under U.S.
law, for example, foreign governments must meet U.S. requirements of a
warrant based on probable cause to access the content of communications
stored within the United States’ borders.252 This raises a host of critical
questions: when, if ever, should requesting states be permitted to obtain data
held within the United States’ jurisdiction based on something less than
probable cause, or absent sign-off by a U.S. magistrate? What minimal
substantive requirements should exist? What minimal procedural
requirements? Should those requirements turn on either the nature of the data
or the purpose for which it is being collected? One possible response is the
“bilateral parity” solution proposed by Stephen Schulhofer. Under this
arrangement, each state would be required to provide other states’ citizens the
same protections it provides its own.253 This solution addresses the difficulties
of harmonizing multiple, diverse systems, yet also ensures that participating
states agree to subject themselves to whatever substantive and procedural
standards are applied.

249.

See supra Section I.C.3.

250.

See David Kris, Preliminary Thoughts on Cross-Border Data Requests, LAWFARE (Sept. 28, 2015,
9:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/preliminary-thoughts-cross-border-data-requests
[http://perma.cc/Z8HB-LAQL] (raising concerns about the divergence between the
jurisdictional scope of what David Kris calls “surveillance prohibitions” and “surveillance
compulsions”).
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That said, there may also be good reason for a divergent approach to regulation and
compulsion. I do not seek here to tackle all of the complex factors raised by these
jurisdictional tests—something I hope to do in later work—but rather seek only to identify
the issues.
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18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2703(a) (2012).

253.

See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy? Be Careful What You Wish
for 26 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 508, 2015), http://lsr
.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/508 [http://perma.cc/N6NX-3NZR] (“Instead of working toward a
comprehensive multilateral framework . . . any nation could negotiate a bilateral agreement
with any other, with each party merely committing to extend to citizens of the other
whatever safeguards it observed in connection with surveillance of its own citizens.”).
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Third, any such agreements need to address recipient process questions—an
issue distinct from the procedural standards applicable to the requesting
government. To whom should the requests be made? Under U.S. law, foreign
governments seeking the content of the communications must work through
the U.S. government. But they can obtain noncontent data directly from the
companies themselves. Should foreign governments ever be permitted to access
data directly from U.S-based providers? Should limits be placed on when
foreign governments can directly request noncontent information?254 There are
obvious efficiency gains in permitting direct company compulsion. But there
are also costs in terms of accountability and oversight.
Finally, an institutional point: whatever one decides is the best approach,
the policy and diplomatic reverberations will be global. These are decisions that
should be made by the political branch, not unelected federal judges. Put
bluntly, however the Second Circuit comes out in Microsoft, Congress and the
Executive need to engage.255 A win for Microsoft would impose a set of
territorial-based rules onto un-territorial data. This outcome fails to reflect the
unique features of data and would likely fuel data localization movements,
which in turn undercut the overall efficiency of the Internet. Conversely, a win
for the government would establish a dangerous precedent under which
nations can unilaterally—without agreed-upon substantive or procedural
standards—compel the production of data located anywhere in the world
simply by asserting jurisdiction over the company controlling the data.
c o n c lu s io n
Data is shaking territoriality at its core. Whereas territoriality depends on
the ability to define the relevant “here” and “there,” data is everywhere and
anywhere and calls into question which “here” and “there” matter. This Article
exposes the ways in which data undercuts longstanding assumptions about the
territorial reach of the Fourth Amendment, the viability of territorial-based
distinctions in surveillance law, and the territorial limits to judges’ warrant
authority. But just as the challenges posed by data are multilayered and
complex, so too are the solutions.

254.

See, e.g., Greg Nojeim, MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal, ACSBLOG (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/mlat-reform-a-straw-man-proposal [http://perma.cc/PGZ4
-YHDV] (suggesting that more sensitive noncontent data, such as transactional records,
should be treated like content and, therefore, should be subject to a government-togovernment disclosure scheme).

255.

Notably, I am not alone in this sentiment. See, e.g., Oral Argument Transcript, 2d Cir.,
Microsoft, supra note 2, at 95 (transcribing Judge Lynch urging Congress to engage).
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To date, the government has gotten it precisely backwards. Territorialbased distinctions embedded in the Fourth Amendment and the statutorybased surveillance scheme governing electronic surveillance fail to serve the
very interests they are designed to protect. Such distinctions should be
eliminated, at least with respect to the seizure of data. At the same time, the
Executive should not run roughshod over territorial-based limitations with
respect to law enforcement jurisdiction, but should instead engage key foreign
partners and seek consensus for a new approach.
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